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PRE-OPERATING EXPENSES AND SECTION 174: 
WILL SNOW FALL? 
John W. Lee '~ 
Section 174 permits a taxpayer to elect a current deduction for research 
or experimental expenditures paid or incurred by him during the tax-
able year "in connection with his trade or business." Expenditures to 
develop new products unrelated to existing product lines of a trade 
or business may qualify.' But for over a decade the Tax Court and 
lower federal courts have interpreted section 174 to require that the 
taxpayer be engaged in a going trade or business." In Snow v. Com-
missioner 3 the Tax Court and Sixth Circuit recently held that the going 
trade or business requirement is not met unless the taxpayer holds him-
self out to others as providing goods or services. Under this view, there 
would be no deduction for expenditures for research and development 
( "R & D") that is undertaken when the taxpayer is just beginning his 
operation and does not have any products to sell. Thus, a small enter-
prise undertaking R & D for its first invention, which is unrelated to 
any mainline trade or business, would not be entitled to a section 174 
deduction, but a venture already engaged in the business of experi-
mentation and development of new products, i.e., inventing or general 
business, would be able to deduct R & D expenditures for new products 
even though not related to current product lines or manufacturing 
processes. 
In Snow the taxpayer was a limited partner in three partnerships each 
of which was formed to carry on R & D for a particular invention. In 
addition to investing in the partnerships, the taxpayer rendered advisory 
and management services to them. By 1966, the tax year at issue, two 
of the partnerships had developed their inventions to the stage of being 
ready for sale, and one of these partnerships had in fact applied for a 
patent. The third partnership was just beginning its operations in 1966 
and could not offer to sell any of its products during the year. It had no 
patent issued or pending on its invention (a trash burner), nor did it 
have income from the sale of licenses or any other source. On these 
*John W. Lee (A.B., North Carolina, 1965; LL.B, Virginia, 1968; LL.M., George-
town, 1970) is a member of the Virginia and North Carolina bars, and is associated 
with the firm of Hirschler and Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia. 
1 Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277 (1973); Rev. Rul. 71-162, 1971-1 C.B. 97. 
2 John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 ( 1961); accol'd, Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 
326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968) (existing trade or business); William Tiffin Downs, 49 
T.C. 533, 540 (1968); Martin Mayrath, 41 T.C. 582 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 209 (5th 
Cir. 1966); Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277, 1279 ( 1973); Charles H. Schafer, 
23 TCM 927 (1964). 
3 482 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 1973 ), rel'l. )!,l'anted, 94 S. Ct. 846 (Jan. 7, 1974) 
(No. 73-641). 
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facts, the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit held that the third partnership 
was not engaged in any trade or business, including that of inventing 
or development of inventions, so that there was no trade or business 
for its 1966 R & D expenditures to be paid in connection with. 4 The 
Circuit Court further concluded that the taxpayer-limited partner's invest-
ment activities in the three partnerships were not sufficiently continuous 
or regular to represent his engaging in a trade or business, and that 
under Whipple v. Commi.r.rioner" the furnishing of managerial services 
did not constitute a trade or business. Accordingly, it held that the 
1966 R & D expenditures were not paid in connection with the limited 
partner's business either." 
The Surireme Court has granted certiorari in Snow. The case presents 
four distinct issues upon which the Supreme Court's decision could rest: 
( 1) Whether section 174 requires a distinction between trade or 
business expenses and expenses preparatory to engaging in a trade 
or business; 
( 2) Whether the trade or business concept includes a requirement 
of holding one's self out to others as providing goods or services; 
( 3) Whether the trade or business of a partnership is imputed to a 
limited partner, and, if so, whether that treatment affects the character 
of the partner's activities in another separate partnership; and 
( 4) Whether a tax shelter motive should affect the timing or deducti-
bility of expenses. 
SECTION 174 AND PREPARATORY EXPENSES 
Prior to 1926, the regulations permitted the optional expensing or 
capitalization of expenditures for experiments intended to improve 
facilities or products. 7 In 1925, however, the Board of Tax Appeals 
ruled in Gilliam Manllfactllring Co." that amounts expended to acquire 
patents were capital expenditures and that a taxpayer had no option to 
deduct them currently. Accordingly, the Treasury deleted the option 
from the regulations in 1926." The Internal Revenue Service continued 
generally to permit taxpayers to deduct expenditures paid in connection 
with regular and continual research activities, 10 but on those unpredict-
·• Edwin A. Snow, 58 T.C. 585, 597 ( 1972); a/J' d -182 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 
1973). 
" 3 73 u.s. 193, 202-03 ( 1963). 
" -182 F.2d 1029, 103-1 (6th Cir. 1973). 
7 Article 168 of Treas. Reg. -15, 62 and 65; Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 
321, 313 (1955). 
s 1 B.T.A. 967, 970 ( 1925). 
"Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 321, 3'i'i ( 1955). 
10 Address by Commissioner of Internal Revenue Dunlap, to the Joint Committee on 
Internal Revenue Taxation on April -1, 1952, 5 CCH 1952 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 
1f 6170 [hereinafter cited as Address by Commissioner Dunlap]. See Swanson, Tax 
Treatment of Research and Exfm·imentation Exf>enditure.r, 3-1 TAXES 511 ( 1956) 
[hereinafter cited as Swanson]. 
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able occasions when it challenged such deductions the court approved the 
disallowance.11 For instance, Goodell-Pratt Co./2 an early Board of 
Tax Appeals decision frequently relied upon in such cases, reasoned that 
R & D expenditures must be capitalized because " [ t} hey were expended 
expressly for the purpose of increasing the earning capacity of the enter-
prise in acquiring something of permanent use in the business." 13 In 
1951, Representative Camp, a member of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, inserted in the Congressional Record a summary explanation 
of a Proposed Revenue Revision Act of 19 51 submitted by the American 
Bar Association. That explanation, in describing a provision quite simi-
lar to section 17 4, stated as follows: 
In order to clarify the existing confusion in respect to the tax treat-
ment of such expenditures, and to prevent tax discrimination be-
tween large businesses having continuous programs of research and 
small or beginning business enterprises, Section 154 provides gen-
erally that expenditures made in industrial or commercial research 
and development or improvement of industrial or commercial prod-
ucts, service or processes may, at the election of the taxpayer, be 
deducted as expenses or capitalized and charged off over a period 
selected and designated by the taxpayer. 14 
The House and Senate Committee reports on the 1954 Code recognized 
the uncertainty in the existing law and made clear that the purpose of 
section 174 was jointly to eliminate the uncertainty and to encourage 
taxpayers to carry on research and experimentation/ 5 by allowing them 
the election of either a current deduction or a deferred deduction of 
R & D expenditures until the invention is first put to an income-
producing use, followed thereafter by amortization of such deferred 
expenditures over a sixty-month period. (If no election for deduction 
or sixty-month amortization were made, the taxpayer would capitalize 
the full amount of the expenditure and presumably amortize it over 
the useful life of any resulting invention, provided that such life was 
determinable, or deduct it as a loss incurred in a transaction entered into 
for profit when the project was abandoned.) 16 The Chairmen of the 
11 Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 321, 343 (1955); accord, Ward v. United 
States, 32 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Mass. 1940); Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., 12 
T.C. 760 (1949), alf'd, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950); Claude Neon Lights, Inc. 35 
B.T.A. 424, 442 ( 193 7). Senator Millikin, in introducing section 174 of the 1954 
Code to the Senate stated that the "tax laws take a curiously cold and unpredictable 
attitude toward such expenses." 100 CoN G. REC. 8998 ( 1954). 
1z 3 B.T.A. 30 ( 1925). 
13 Id. at 36. 
14 97 CONG. REC. A4326 ( 1951) (remarks of Representative Camp) (Appendix). 
15 H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., 28 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 
2d Sess., 33 (1954). 
16 Swanson, suj1ra note 10, at 542. Recent developments, particularly Harris W. 
Seed, 52 T.C. 880 (1969), have settled that a taxpayer is entitled to an abandonment" 
loss as to pre-operating expenses as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit under 
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Congressional tax committees repeated in their explanations of section 
174 to their respective Houses of Congress that it was intended to 
eliminate the competitive disadvantage under the current law to small 
businesses that attempted to develop new products without established 
research programs since they were frequently not permitted to deduct 
their expenses, unlike large and well-established competitors with expan-
sive regular research budgetsY 
In 1961, the Tax Court ruled in John F. Koom 18 that the term 
"trade or business" in section 174 was used in the sense of a "going" 
trade or business. The taxpayer in Koon.r had contracted with a research 
laboratory that was to develop an invention, then in a primitive state, 
to the stage of commercial acceptance. The court held that development 
activity of this type was preliminary to the existence of a trade or busi-
ness of the taxpayer and that section 174 applied only to R & D expen-
ditures made in connection with an existing trade or business, i.e., 
expenditures for development or improvement of existing products or 
services or development of new products or services in connection with 
an existing business. Ironically, the facts in Koon.r are virtually identical 
to those in Hart-Bartlett-SturteMnt Grain Co., 10 a 1939 Code decision 
which Koon.r recognized as one of the line of cases treating R & D as 
capital expenditures, a result which section 174 was intended in alleviate. 
The Tax Court in Koon.r looked to the decisions under section 162 
on business investigation ~" and concluded that expenditures made in 
investigating a potential business or preparatory to entering into a busi-
ness were not made in connection with an existing trade or business, and 
hence were not deductible.21 Business investigation expenses consist of 
costs incurred in investigation of a prospective business prior to reaching 
a firm decision whether to acquire it. 2 ~ These expenditures are com-
monly distinguished from pre-operating expenses (also called start-up 
or pre-opening costs), which are paid during the time between the 
decision to establish or acquire a new business and the beginning of 
actual business operations. 2 ~ The term usually refers to expenses which 
would be currently deductible if they had been incurred after business 
operations had begun in full flower. Typical examples of pre-operating 
section 165(c) (2) provided that "the taxpayer be committed-at least mentally, if not 
legally-to the accomplishment of the business venture." Wilberding, An Indiz,id-
ua/'s Business Investigation Expenses: An Argument Supportill?. Deductibility, 26 
TAX LAWYER 219, 241 ( 1973) [hereinafter cited as Wilberding}. 
17 100 CoNG. REC. 3425 (1954) (remarks of Representative Reed); 100 CONG. 
REC. 8998 (1954) (remarks of Senator Millikin). 
1s 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 ( 1961). 
to 12 T.C. 760 (1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950). 
20 Discussed infra in text accompanying notes 71-77. 
21 3 5 T.C. 1092, 1100 ( 1961). 
22 1 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. \11332.1325. 
23 See United States v. Richmond Television Corp., 345 F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir.), 
11acated and remanded per curiam 011 other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965). 
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expenses are costs of advertising and promotion, training of employees, 
lining up suppliers and potential customers or distributors, and legal 
and accounting services in setting up books and records.24 Expenditures 
for R & D, although capital, are pre-operating and not investigatory 
expenditures. Distinctions analogous to investigatory, pre-operating, and 
operating expenses also exist in the areas of farming 25 and mining.26 
The Sixth Circuit in Snow relied heavily on the landmark Fourth 
Circuit decision in Richmond Television Corp. 27 The Richmond Tele-
vi.rion case arose under section 162 and was the first rna jor decision to 
extend the investigation precedents to the pre-operating stage of an 
enterprise (while recognizing that the problems were not identical), 
thereby requiring capitalization of start-up costs. It also laid the 
foundation for government reliance, when advocating application of a 
preparatory to engaging in a trade or business doctrine, on the definition 
of a trade or business as "holding one's self out to others as engaged in 
selling." Mr. Justice Frankfurter first offered this definition in his 
concurring opinion in Dep11ty F. D11Pont/8 an investor expense case 
arising prior to the enactment of the predecessor of section 212. The 
Sixth Circuit in Snow noted that the Tax Court below had applied the 
term trade or business "as that phrase had been construed at the time 
2
·
1 1 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. 1]1332.1325; Erbacher, Start-up Costs: Are 
They Deductible by a Corporation for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 48 TAXES -188 
(1970). 
25 Preparatory expenses (typically clearing, leveling or conditioning land, planting 
trees, installing irrigation systems) which are incurred prior to raising agricultural com-
modities in order to begin the growing process must be capitalized. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.180-1(b). Developmental expenditures are incurred so that the growing process once 
commenced, may continue in the desired manner. The taxpayer may expense or capital-
ize such expenditures at his option. The productive stage is reached when the farm 
becomes a fullfledged operating business. Preparatory expenses can never be deducted, 
and developmental expenses can no longer be capitalized after the productive stage is 
met. Developmental expenditures like start-up costs are expenses that if incurred after 
the enterprise becomes fully operative are currently deductible. 
26 Exploratory expenditures correspond to investigatory expenditures, consisting of 
expenditures for the purpose of ascertaining the existence, location, extent of quality 
of ore and mineral deposits. I.R.C. §§ 616, 617. Developmental expenditures corre-
spond to pre-operating expenses and agricultural developmental expenditures because 
after the mine reaches the "producing" or full operating stage similar expenditures such 
as the costs of shafts, tunnels, etc. required to maintain the output of the mine are 
currently deductible. Alexander & Grant, Mine Det,elopment and Exp/orati011 Ex-
penditures, 8 TAX. L. REV., 401, 403, 409 ( 1953) [hereinafter cited as Alexander & 
Grant). Prior to the Revenue Act of 1951, both exploration and development ex-
penditures had to be capitalized. ld. at 403. Thereafter both could be deducted 
subject to complex recapture or recoupment and limitation rules applicable to ex-
ploratory expenditures. See l.R.C. of 1939 § 23(ff); I.R.C. §§ 615, 617. Develop-
mental expenditures, also described as operating expenses, S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 188 (1969), have also been deductible since 1951 without limitation 
or recapture. I.R.C. of 1939 § 23(cc); I.R.C. § 616. The parallel between develop-
ment costs and R&D was noticed early on. Alexander & Grant, supra at 409. 
2 7 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965), t:arated and 1·emanded per curiam on other 
grou11ds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965). 
28 308 u.s. 488, 499 (1940). 
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of the Congressional enactment of Section 174." 29 It concluded that 
the above-quoted comments by Representative Camp could not set aside 
such "settled interpretation" of trade or business as used in section 
174. 30 Similarly, the Tax Court in Koons had read the Committee 
Reports relating to section 162 as manifesting approval of this doctrine." 1 
The legislative history to section 162 relied upon by the court in 
Koons establishes that in fact the 1954 Code concept of a trade or busi· 
ness did not differ from the 19 39 Code concept. 32 Surveying the relevant 
business expense cases decided prior to the 1954 Code reveals that none 
of them relied upon the taxpayer's failure to hold himself out to others 
as a seller, nor had they established any going trade or business test which 
would preclude deduction of pre-operating expenses."" Indeed, virtually 
none of these decisions, including the landmark Morton Frank decision, 3 '1 
involved pre-operating expenses, but rather dealt only with investigatory 
expenses incurred prior to a firm decision to enter into a particular busi-
ness. 3 '' A possible exception, Mid-State ProdHcts Co., 36 involving, in 
29 482 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 1973). 
30 Id. at 1032. Strangely, the Sixth Circuit did not mention the remarks of Repre-
sentative Reed, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who also noted the 
(discriminatory) tax preference given to "large and well-established competitors" as to 
deduction of R & D in his presentation of the 1954 Code to the House. 100 CoNG. 
REC. 3425 (1954). The taxpayer cited both the 1951 and 1954 legislative history to 
the Court. Brief for Appellant at 33, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973). 
The point is brought out very clearly in the comments of Senator Millikin in intro-
ducing the 1954 Code to the Senate, 100 CONG. REc. 8998 ( 1954): 
Many large businesses with regular research and experimental budgets have as 
a practical matter been able to secure the current deduction of most of these 
expenses. Many small businesses, however, which have not been able to afford 
a large regular budget for research have been at a disadvantage because of 
uncertainties concerning the deductibility of their expenditures. . . . The 
bill corrects this impediment by providing a definite option for the tax-
payer to deduct such expenses or to capitalize them and write them off over 
a period of not less than 5 years. 
:n 35 T.C. 1099 (1961) (citiug S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 
(1954). 
32 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A43 ( 1943); S. REP. No. 1622, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 ( 1954). 
3 3 See, e.g., Mid-State Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 696 (1954) (promulgated on February 15) 
acquiesced iu, 1955·2 ·c.s. 7; Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332, 343-44 (1953), acqui-
esced in, 1956-1 C.B. 6; aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 
511 (1953); George C. Westervelt, 8 T.C 1248, 1254 (1947); RobertS. Seese, 7 T.C. 
925, 927 (1946); James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603, 605 (1944); Benjamin Miggins, 8 
TCM 82 (1949). 
3 4 20 T.C. 511 (1953). 
35 See Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in llwestigation for a 
BusinesJ· or CafJital lntJestmmt, I;( TAX L. REV. 567 ( 1959) [hereinafter cited as 
Fleischer}. 
36 21 T.C. 696, 714-17 (1954) (decided on February 15, 1945). This decision 
could be classified as both an investigatory and pre-operating expense decision. In-
vestigation for expansion into a related manufacturing venture began halfway through 
taxpayer's fiscal year ending November 30. Around September 15 after an option on 
another production facility lapsed, taxpayer acquired a lease and began remodeling. 
Production contracts and special war-time permits were acquired by the middle of Octo-
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part, pre-operating expenditures as well as investigatory expenditures, 
was handed down three weeks prior to the publication of the House 
Report on the 1954 Code. Mid-State Prod11ct.r rested on Goodell-Pratt 
Co.'s theory that expenses which were intended to increase earning power 
must be capitalized and not on the theory based upon a failure to hold 
one's self out as a seller. Significantly, Goodell-Pratt was also relied 
upon by most of the pre-1954 R & D decisions which section 174 
was intended to overrule.'" Frank, too, has been analyzed by subsequent 
decisions as being based upon this reasoning."8 In short, the Sixth Circuit 
would have Congress in 1954 intending to incorporate into section 174 
a theory under section 162 that was simply not present or "settled" in 
the then-existing cases. The court's error was no doubt induced in part 
by the case-law use of the term "preparatory expenses" to describe both 
business investigation expenses and pre-operating expenses. Clarity 
would have been attained more easily had the term "preparatory ex-
penses" been limited to investigatory expenditures and pre-operating 
costs been categorized as "development expenditures." 
What then was the Congressional intent in incorporating a trade or 
business requirement into section 17 4? It is submitted that Congress only 
contemplated imposition of profit motive and continuity requirements-
that the R & D activities must be carried on with an expectation of 
economic return as an end product of the R & 0,3" and that the taxpayer 
must devote a substantial portion of his time to the activities or there 
must have been extensive or repeated activity over a substantial period of 
ber. Production began in December with the first deliveries in January. The taxpayer 
initially charged the expenditures at issue (consisting of salaries, travel expenses, tele-
phone, office supplies, etc.) to a "deferred development and pre-operating expense 
account," and capitalized them. The Tax Court disallowed the taxpayer's later attempts 
to deduct the expenses, which it agreed were usually currently deductible on the 
grounds that they increased the taxpayer's earning capacity by setting up a new busi-
ness and because the costs were "more nearly comparable to the costs of surveys pre-
liminary to the organization of any business corporation or venture" and hence were 
preliminary to entry into the new business. 21 T.C. 7 H. 716-17. It is submitted that 
at least under the rationale of York v. Comm"r, 261 F.2d -·121 (-lth Cir. 1958), the 
expenses were deductible as ordinary and necessary to the existing, related business. 
The increase in earning capacity rationale is criticized at note 53 infra. 
:n See, e.~;., Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co .. 12 T.C. 760, 766 (19-19). aff'd, 182 
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950); Hazeltine Corp., 32 B.T.A. 110, 122 (1935), aff'd, 89 
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 193 7); John F. Canning, 29 B.T.A. 99. I 07 ( 1933), (l(quie.rced 
in, XIII-I C.B. 3; Forest Prods. Chern. Co .. 27 B.T.A. 638. 6<!1 (1933). a((tuie.rced in. 
XII-1 C. B. 5, aff' d, Dec. 18, 193·1 (6th Cir.). 
as See, e.g., Robert J. Wallendal, 31 T.C. 12·19, 1251 ( 1959); Miron Kroyt, 20 
TCM 1665,1668 (1961). 
30 See, e.g., Mayrath v. Comm'r, 357 F.2d 209. 212 (5th Cir. 1966); William 
Tiffin Downs, -19 T.C. 533, 5-10 (1968), acquie.rced in, 1968-2 C.B. 2; Industrial Re-
search Prods., Inc., -10 T.C. 578, 590 ( 1963), acquie.rad in, 1966-1 C. B. 2; Eugene J. 
Magee, 32 TCM 1277 (1973); Johan A. Louw, 30 TCM H21 (1971); Nicholas A. 
Dodich, 30 TCM 248 ( 1971); Joe H. Cunningham, 27 TCM 1219 ( 1968); Myron 
E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557, 560 (1967); Charles R. Rhoades, 23 TCM 2056 (196·1); 
Charles H. Schafer, 23 TCM 927 (1964); Ervin G. Bailey, 22 TCM 1255 (1963). 
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time.40 As the Fifth Circuit noted in Stanton tJ. Commissioner, 41 Congress 
was probably attempting to correlate the tax treatment of the cost of 
producing a given type of income with the tax character of the income 
produced. 42 In short, it did not want a taxpayer to take a current ordinary 
deduction for his R & D expenditures under section 174 and then 
later rely on the arguments frequently made under the 1939 Code, i.e., 
that any gain on the sale of his invention or process produced by the 
R & D was entitled to capital gains treatment because his development of 
the property was a hobby '' 3 or that his activities were sufficiently sporadic 
so that he did not hold the property for sale to customers in the course 
of a trade or business.44 In none of the significant 1939 Code cases did 
the inventors seeking capital gains treatment rely upon a failure to hold 
one's self out as providing goods or services.''" 
With the exception of Koons, which introduced under section 174 
the concept of expenses preparatory to engaging in a trade or business, 
and Snow, which turned solely on a failure to hold one's self out as 
providing goods or services, all of the noteworthy section 1 7 4 and related 
section 162 cases decided adversely to the taxpayer could have been 
decided on a profit motive or a continuity basis. 46 In fact most were 
decided on such bases, at least in the alternative. Moreover, a recent 
Tax Court opinion explains both Koom and Mayrath, the landmark Tax 
Court R & D decisions prior to Snow, as resting on a continuity theory,47 
which was the usual determinative factor in the pre-1954 Code capital 
gains cases.48 
According to the statement of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation on April 4, 1952, 
4 0 Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968); Martin Mayrath, 41 T.C. 
582, 591 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1966); Industrial Research Prods., Inc., 
40 T.C. 578, 589 (1963), acquiesced in, 1966-1 C.B. 2; Johan A. Louw, 30 TCM 1421 
( 1971); Myron E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557 ( 1967). 
41 399 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1968). 
42 The fact that section 1235 provides for capital gain treatment for the sale of 
patents under some circumstances is not inconsistent with this conclusion. 
43 See, e.g., Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153, 162 ( 1948); Harold T. Avery, 47 
B.T.A. 538, 541 (1942). 
4·1 See Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Beach v. 
Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2 
U.S.T.C. 1[9428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Evans v. Kavanagh, 86 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. 
Mich. 1949), aff'd, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951); Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 
( 1946). See generally Mann, Capital Asset Status of Patents and lm;entions Under 
Generall.R.C. Sections 1221-1223,42 TAXES 317,318-20 (1964). 
45 See Comm'r v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 
619 ( 1939), and numerous authorities cited therein. 
4G See decisions cited in notes 39 and 40 supra. 
47 Oliver B. Kilroy, 32 TCM 27, 29 ( 1973). 
•s See, e.g., Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947); Comm'r v. 
Boeing, 106 F.2d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 619 (1939) (numer-
ous "continuity" authorities cited therein); Snell v. Comm'r, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 
1938). 
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the Service at that time permitted large research laboratories and busi-
nesses with continuing R & D programs to expense R & D on the theory 
that over a period of years the expensing of numerous projects would 
"not appear to create a materially different tax result from the capitaliza-
tion of all such items and the later allowance of deductions for abandoned 
or worthless projects . . . and the allowance of depreciation on suc-
cessful ones .... " .,, Materially different tax results would obtain, how-
ever, when small or beginning businesses first begin to deduct R & D 
expenses of a single project, and in such circumstances the Service was 
apparently hesitant to allow the deduction of R & D expenses. For as 
Representative Reed, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, 
pointed out in addressing the House during consideration of the 1954 
Code: 
[V)ery often, under present law, small businesses which are devel-
oping new products and do not have established research depart-
ments are not allowed to deduct these expenses despite the fact that 
their large and well-established competitors can obtain the deduc-
tion .... [Section 174) will be particularly valuable to small and 
growing businesses."0 
Currently, deductions are permitted under section 174 for R & D 
which in itself does not constitute a "going business" where a corpora-
tion is seeking to develop a new product unrelated to its past line of 
products. Thus, expenses of a continuing R & D program of a large 
business, or of any established business, come within section 174."1 
Conseguently, the Snow decision resurrects the discrimination against 
beginning businesses that section 174 was in large part intended to 
prevent. 
The above disc.ussion establishes that at the time of the Congressional 
enactment of section 174 cases had not yet "settled" whether the prepara· 
tory to engaging in a business concept applied to pre-operating expenses 
as well as business investigation expenses, nor had they justified that 
concept on the argument that a taxpayer had to hold himself out as a 
seller to be engaged in trade or business. Thus, neither the opinion of 
the Tax Court nor the appellate decision in Snow were founded upon 
40 Address by Commissioner Dunlap, sufJra note 10. 
GO 100 CONG. REC. 3425 ( 1954); accord, 100 CONG. REC. 8998 ( 1954) (remarks of 
Senator Millikin). 
"
1 In Best Universal Lock Co., -15 T.C. 1, 9·10 (1965), acquiesced in, 1966-2 C.B. 
1, the Court held that the corporate taxpayer had a continuing history of experimenta-
tion and efforts to develop new products and these projects were an integral part of 
its trade or business, so that section 174 covered its R & D expenses in developing a 
new product unrelated to its past line of products. Cf. York v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421 
(4th Cir. 1958). Rev. Rul. 71-162, 1971-1 C.B. 97, does not appear, however, to 
limit the availability of section 174 as to development of new products or processes 
unrelated to current product lines or manufacturing processes to corporate taxpayers 
with established research departments, as was the case in Best Unit1ersa/ Lock. 
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any pre-1954 construction of the phrase trade or business, despite the 
claims of the Sixth Circuit. In any event, such an approach to statutory 
construction seems too narrow. If the post-19 54 developments under 
section 162 properly deny trade or business status to a pre-operating ven-
ture because it has no goods or services to sell, then the same restrictions 
are likely to be applied to section 174 regardless of Congress' intent in 
1954. Otherwise, the meaning of terms taken from one statutory provi-
sion and incorporated into another would be forever frozen as of the 
time of incorporation."" It is submitted, however, that a lack of a cur-
rent product or service to offer should not preclude attainment of trade 
or business status under either section 162 or 174. Furthermore, the 
other justifications raised from time to time in the cases to support the 
application of the preparatory doctrine to pre-operating expenses are 
equally invalid."" 
"
2 Certainly judicial construction of statutes "demands, on occasions, the projection 
of their expressed purpose to situations not precisely in the minds of those who en-
acted them." Warren R. Miller, Sr., 51 T.C. 755, 761 (1969). Freezing "trade or 
business" in section 171 as of 1951 is hardly consistent with this principle. Neverthe-
less, incorporation of a statutory phrase into another provision "calls for practical and 
sensible interpretation in fitting the provisions of the adopted statute into the scheme 
of the adopting one." Id. A strong argument may be made that incorporation of the 
preparatory doctrine with its discrimination between businesses with existing research 
departments and beginning businesses and its remedy of capitalization is not consistent 
with the purposes of section 171. In essence, although not articulated in these terms, 
this was the principal argument made by the taxpayer in Snow to the Sixth Circuit and 
raised in the application for certiorari. The taxpayer conceded that the "preparatory" 
versus "existing" test was logical and proper in terms of the "ordinary and necessary" 
requirement of section 162, but asserted that it was illogical as applied to R & D under 
section 171, which presupposes a product which is not yet in a marketable condition. 
Brief for Appellant at 39-40, Snow v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973). cert . 
. ~ranted, 91 S. Ct. 816 (Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 73-M1); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
at 10-11. In his reply brief, the taxpayer relined his argument,, maintaining that the 
holding one's self out doctrine was derived from the verb "to carry on" which was 
not used in section 17-1. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Snow v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 
1029 (6th Cir. 1973), eM. granted, 9-1 S. Ct. 816 (Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 73-611); ac-
t'ord, Petition for a Writ, suJira. 
""The other major rationale is that pre-operating expenses must be capitalized because 
they increase future earning power and thereby provide benefits to future years. Mid-
State Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 696, 7H ( 195-1). This reasoning is contradicted by the 
advertising cases, .ree notes 159-6if infra and accompanying text, and its conceptual basis 
was fatally eroded by the Supreme Court's rejection in Comm'r v. Lincoln Savings & 
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 315, 35-1 (1971 ), of the "future benefit" definition of capital 
expenditures. The Government's frequent reliance on absence of gross receipts, Brief 
for Respondent at 35, Edwin A. Snow, 58 T.C. 585 (1972); Brief for Appellant at 12, 
Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 3-15 F.2d 901 ( -1th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter 
cited as Brief for Appellant, Richmond Television] is negated by the authorities cited 
in note 100, infra. A few preparatory decisions have capitalized pre-opening expenses 
on the ground that they are an integral part of the total cost of such assets. See, e.g., 
Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 2-i I ( 1959), acquie.rced in, 1960-1 C. B. 5. But where such 
expenses, if incurred after the venture is in full flower, would be deductible, deducti-
bility during the developmental period should be allowed. D. Joseph St. Germain, 18 
TCM 355 (1959); cf. Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc., 12 TCM 786 (1958); 
Dixie Frosted Foods, 6 TCM 586 ( 1917). See generally Ellentuck, Tax Aspects of 
Organizing and OJ,erating Hotels and Motel.r, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 887, 
900 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ellentuck). 
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PREPARATORY TO ENGAGING IN A TRADE OR BUSINESS 
The status of pre-operating activities was litigated in the late 1920's 
and early 1930's under the net operating loss provisions of the early 
Revenue Acts. These provisions required that in order for a loss carry 
forward to be deductible against business income it must result from the 
"operation of a trade or businss regularly carried on by the taxpayer." "·' 
The Board of Tax Appeals held in Harrisburg Hospital, Inc. 55 that a 
taxpayer which constructed a hospital during the two tax years in which 
losses arose and did not receive income until the completion of construc-
tion in the following year, was not actually engaged in carrying on a 
trade or business, but was merely making preparations to do so. The 
Board followed Harrisburg Hospital in cases where a taxpayer during 
the loss years had been constructing an office building that was not ready 
for occupancy until the following year,"" and where a taxpayer acquired 
land and prepared for subdivision and marketing but made no sales 
before the close of the loss yearY The Board also followed Harrisburg 
Hospital in determining that the development stage of a mine prior to 
producing status did not constitute a trade or business regularly carried 
on.58 Only the office building decision, 379 Madison A(!en11e, Inc.,"" 
was appealed. The Second Circuit there reversed the Board of Tax 
Appeals on the grounds that the corporate taxpayer, by improving real 
estate, negotiating leases, and incurring ground rents, interest and taxes, 
was regularly carrying on its business for which it was chartered, even 
though that business was not yet at full flower. 60 
After this brief flurry, the next significant development, not consider-
ing Dep11ty 11. DuPont, 61 was the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald 
11. Commissioner."" In McDonald, the Court denied deductibility of 
campaign expenses of a state court judge serving an interim appoint· 
ment who was seeking election for a full term, on the grounds that they 
"
4 Revenue Act of 1921, §204(a), 42 Stat. 227. See l.R.C. of 1939, §122(d)(5); 
Revenue Act of 1939, § 211(b), 53 Stat. 862. 
"" 15 B.T.A. 1011, 1018 (1929). 
"
6 379 Madison Avenue, Inc., 23 B.T.A. 29, 44 (1931 ), rerld, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 
1932). 
57 Birdneck Realty Corp., 25 B.T.A. 1084 (1932), acquiesced in, Xl-1 C.B. 2. 
r;s New Quincy Mining Co., 36 B.T.A. 3 76 ( 193 7). 
"
9 379 Madison Avenue, Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1932). 
60 Id. However, the precedential value of 379 Madison A11enue may have been eroded 
by Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), for 379 Madison Ar,enue relied upon 
decisions such as Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107 ( 1911), dealing with 
whether certain corporations came within provisions levying an excise tax on corporations 
"carrying on or doing business." Higgins held, however, that such cases were not con-
trolling as to whether the taxpayer, an individual, was carrying on a business under the 
predecessor to section 162. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the distinction lies 
between individual and corporate taxpayers, with Flint 11. Stone Tracy possessing con-
tinuing vitality as to corporate taxpayers under section 162. 
61 See note 28 supra. 
62 323 u.s. 57 ( 1944). 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 27, No. 3 
392 SECTION OF TAXATION 
were not "incurred in being a judge but in trying to be a judge for the 
next ten years." '"' Therefore, the Court concluded, the expenses were 
not incurred in his business of judging. The Supreme Court also relied 
heavily, however, upon the powerful considerations of public policy in-
volved in permitting the deductibility of campaign expenses for public 
office. 6 '1 Some, but not many, of the ~ubsequent decisions on activities 
preparatory to engaging in a trade or business read the above quotation 
from McDonald as supporting the conclusion that expenses incurred in 
preparation for entering a trade or business were not deductible, i.e., they 
apparently read the Supreme Court as reasoning that until elected to a 
full term, McDonald was not engaged in the business of being a judge, 
and thus, the campaign expenses were incurred in preparation of such 
business.6 " In so doing, they overlooked the preceding sentence: "He 
could, that is, deduct all expenses that related to the discharge of his 
functions as a judge."66 In short, the taxpayer in McDonald was engaged 
in the business of being a judge, but the campaign expenses were not or-
dinary and necessary expenses of that business since they had no relation 
to the performance of judicial duties.''7 Most of the campaign expense 
progeny of McDonald either relied upon that rationale, public policy, 68 or 
the theory that campaign expenses were personal. 110 Indeed, it has 
been noted that the McDonald briefs framed the issue in terms of public 
policy.' 0 Thus, McDonald properly should have no impact upon either 
the investigatory or pre-operating expense issues. 
The first investigatory expense decision was the 1947 Tax Court 
opinion in George C. W e.rtervelt. 71 That case denied the taxpayer any 
deduction for traveling expenses incurred on trips to collect data, in-
vestigate lands and cattle breeding methods, seek a foundation herd, 
and acquire bulls. The court, without citing McDo11ald or the prior 
net operating loss decisions, held that the taxpayer was not yet engaged 
in carrying on a cattle business. "The trips were preparatory to entering 
63 I d. at 60. 
6
'
1 James B. Carey, 56 T.C 477, 480 (1971), acquiesced in, 1971-2 CB. 2, alf'd fJer 
curiam, 460 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert. dmied, 409 U.S. 990 ( 1972). 
65 See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1964); 
John F. Koons, 35 T.C 1092, 1102 (1961); Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511, 514 (1953); 
Myron E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557, 560 ( 1967). Compare Horace E. Nichols, 60 T.C 236 
(1973) (dissenting opinion) (running for office does not constitute trade or business, 
but expenses are deductible under section 212 absent public policy considerations). See 
generally Wilberding, note 16 supra at 230; Fleischer, note 35 supra at 570. 
66 See note 62 supra, at 60. 
67 See Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.), ce1·t. denied, 345 U.S. 969 (1953); 
James B. Carey, 56 T.C 477, 481 ( 1971) (Tannewald, J.). But see Horace E. Nichols, 
60 T.C 236 (1973) (Tannewald, ].). 
68 See Maness v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 918, 919 (M.D. Fla. 1965), alf'd on 
other grounds, 367 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1966); Horace E. Nichols, 60 T.C. 236 (1973). 
69 See Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401, 403 (4th Cir. 1953). 
70 James B. Carey, 56 T.C 477,488 n.2 (1971) (dissenting opinion). 
71 8 T.C. 1248, 1254 ( 1947). See generally Fleischer, note 35 supra at 568-69. 
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the cattle business." :2 WeJtervelt was followed in 1953 by several "pre-
paratory" decisions n decided before the House proposals for the 1954 
Code, all of which involved investigatory expenses. The same was 
true of the frequently cited preparatory expenses cases, such as Frank B. 
Polachek 74 and Hemy G. Owei1, 7 " decided later in 1954. The only 
rationale offered in any of these opinions, other than the mere conclusion 
that the expenses were in preparation for a potential business, was that 
they were incurred in order to maintain or acquire an asset that would 
produce future income and, hence, were capital expenditures.'6 More-
over, this was the reasoning of Mid-State Prod11ctJ Co., 77 the only deci-
sion during this period which applied the preparatory expense doctrine 
to the pre-operating expenses of a taxpayer who had made a firm decision 
to enter a business which was not yet productive. As pointed out in 
the prior discussion, in view of the then existing state of the law, Con-
gress could not possibly have intended in 1954 to incorporate into the 
term "trade or business" a well-settled pre-operating expense doctrine 
which turned on whether the taxpayer was yet holding himself out to 
others as providing goods or services. 
For the rest of the decade, with minor exceptions, 78 the preparatory 
concept was judicially applied only to investigatory expenditures and 
expenses of seeking a new job. Then, in the early sixties, the doctrine 
began to be raised frequently in two areas where the taxpayer's activities 
had progressed beyond the investigatory stage: farm or hobby loss deci-
sions 7n and R & 0 cases.80 The courts at first did not appear aware 
that there was any distinction between investigatory and pre-operating 
expenses, but, particularly in the farm loss area, articulated the rationale 
72 8 T.C. at 1254. 
73 Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332, 343 (1953), aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); 
Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511,514 (1953). 
7·1 22 T.C. 858, 863 (1954) (taxpayer merely had plans for a potential business; the 
plans never materialized and were still in a formative stage when abandoned). See 
Allan Cunningham, 22 T.C. 906, 911 ( 1954). 
7
" 23 T.C. 377, 381 (1954) (expenses preparatory to resumption of business and, 
therefore, foundation for future income); accord, Raymond L. Collier, 13 TCM 857 
(1954) (overruled by Primuth). 
76 Henry G. Owen, 23 T.C. 377, 381 ( 1954); accord, James M. Osborne, 3 T.C. 603, 
605 (1944). See Frederick A. Purdy, 12 T.C. 888, 893 (1949). The Tax Court in 
Robert S. Seese, 7 T.C. 925, 927 ( 1946), described as preparatory certain clearly per-
sonal expenses, which it disallowed as such. Cf. Vincent W. Eckel, 33 TCM 147, 155 
( 1974). Indeed, one commentator has suggested that many of the investigatory expense 
decisions are explainable as a reaction to deductions claimed for dubious expenses. 
Note, lnz•eJtigation Costs: An Analysis and a Proposal. IJ1 TEMPLE L. Q. 81 (1967). 
77 21 T.C. 696,714-17 (1954). See note 36 sufJra. 
78 Cohn v. United States, 57-1 USTC \[9457 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd 011 other 
grounds, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (relied upon erroneous definition of capital 
expenditure as non-recurring). 
79Edwin H. Miner, 21 TCM 1173 (1962); accord, Proebstle v. United States, 65-2 
USTC \[9497 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Edward R. Godfrey, 22 TCM 1 ( 1963), aff' d on other 
grounds, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), cerl. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1966). 
so E.g., John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092 ( 1961). 
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that preparatory expenditures constituted capital expenditures because 
"[t]hey were analogous to the amassing of the capital assets such as 
the plant and machinery of a manufacturing business, preparatory to the 
actual beginning of business operations." 81 Against this background the 
Fourth Circuit decided the landmark pre-operating expense decision, 
Richmond Television Corporation z·. United States/" over 10 years after 
the enactment of the 1954 Code. 
At issue in that case was the deductibility of the costs incurred prior 
to receipt of an FCC license in training a staff to operate a television 
station. The Government argued on brief that the expenditures had to be 
capitalized because (a) they created a reservoir of skills necessary for 
television broadcasting that would extend beyond the year paid, and 
(b) they would contribute to the production of income over a number 
of years so that charging them off against the income of a single year 
would result in a gross distortion of that year's income. 83 The taxpayer 
countered with the argument that there is no legal requirement that ex-
penses must produce income in the year that they are incurred. In addi-
tion, it raised the pre-operating expense issue itself by challenging the 
Government to produce a case or ruling that denied the deduction of 
start-up costs.84 The Fourth Circuit, while holding in the alternative, as 
the Government had argued, that the expenditures were capital because 
they constituted the cost of acquiring an asset benefiting the taxpayer 
for more than one year, took up that challenge. It stated that the precise 
question was the deductibility of "pre-opening" expenses incurred be-
tween the decision to establish a business and the actual beginning of 
business operations (although in fact this had not been the "precise 
question" argued by the Government) .85 Noting that there was little 
81 Edwin H. Miner, 21 TCM 1173, 1177 ( 1962). This analysis has been expressly 
rejected, however, by subsequent decisions due to the "special" farm tax accounting 
rules. See Maple v. Comm'r, 140 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1971); Whitman v. 
United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 851 (W.D. La. 1965) (suggests Miner erroneous). 
8 2 345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Cir.), t:acated and remanded per curiam on other 
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965). 
83 Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Richmond Television Corp., supra note 53. The 
Government did not rely upon any preparatory argument. See Solomon, Tax Treatment 
of Pre-opening Expenses, 46 TAXES 521, 523 n.12 (1968), [hereinafter cited as 
Solomon}. 
84 Brief for Appellee at 9, 13, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 
901 (4th Cir. 1965). 
8 5 The Government had stated the questions as follows: "I. Whether the sums 
expended in training prospective employees of a television station prior to the station's 
receipt of a construction permit and broadcast license are capital expenditures. 2. 
Whether, for tax purposes, the useful life of a television broadcast license issued by 
the Federal Communications Commission is of indefinite duration." Brief for Appellant 
at 2, Richmond Television, supra note 53. Similarly, the Solicitor General, in arguing 
against the grant of certiorari, focused on the capital expenditure argument and referred 
merely in passing and then in only two sentences to the pre-operating expense holding 
of the court below. Memorandum for the United States in Opposition, at 3, Richmond 
Television Corp. v. United States, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965). Moreover, on remand, the 
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discussion in the case law as to when, in point of time, a trade or busi-
ness begins, the court turned to (a) one of the transitional investigatory 
pre-operating expense decisions,86 (b) a number of cases dealing with 
acquisition of a television broadcasting license, only one of which, Peters-
bllrg Teluision Corp., involved when a business began, while the others 
turned on whether expenditures incurred in connection with procurement 
of an FCC television license were capital expenditures,"7 and (c) Cohn 
11. United State.r a pre-operating expense decision, which rested in part 
on an erroneous definition of capital expenditures."" The Fourth Circuit 
summarized its survey with the following frequently cited statement: 
The uniform teaching of these several cases is that, even though 
a taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter into business and over 
a considerable period of time spent money in preparation for enter-
ing that business, he still has not "engaged in carrying on any trade 
or business" within the intendment of section I62(a) until such 
time as the business has begun to function as a going concern and 
performed those activities for which it was organized.8 " 
Without debating the accuracy of the survey, it may be noted that Rich-
mond Telui.rion was one of the first preparatory decisions to refer to the 
Dep11ty 11• D11Pont definition of trade or business as "holding one's self 
out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services." "0 In addi-
tion, the Fourth Circuit appears to have deliberately ignored the reliance 
by both the taxpayer and the district court below "' upon Treasury 
Regulation section 1.248-1 (a) ( 3), which provides that a corporation 
is deemed to have begun business as soon as its activities have advanced 
to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its business operations."" 
Fourth Circuit itself described its prior holding solely in terms of its alternative capital 
asset holding. "For the reasons therein stated we reaffirm our holding that this sum is 
not a deductible business expense for the two years in question within the meaning of 
section 162(a). The expenditures in the advance training of a body of personnel created 
a capital asset, requiring different tax treatment." Richmond Television Corp. v. United 
States, 3 5'1 F.2d -110, 'l 11 (-1th Cir. 1965). 
s,; Frank B. Polachek, 22 T.C. 858 ( 195'1). Polachek is transitional in that while the 
taxpayer was planning a new business investment advisory service, which was never 
formally organized, his solicitation of potential initial clients was similar to the solici-
tation he would have carried on after the business became productive. 
s1 KWTX Broadcasting Co., 31 T.C. 952 ( 1959), aff' d fJer curiam, 272 F.2d -106 
(5th Cir. 1959) ; Radio Station WBIR, 31 T.C. 803 ( 1959); Petersburg Television 
Corp., 20 TCM 271 (1961 ). 
ss 57-1 USTC 1!9·157 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), afl'd oil olher grorwd.r. 259 F.2d 371 
(6th Cir. 1958). See note 78 supra. 
sn 3-15 F.2d 901, 907. The Fourth Circuit's analysis IS ably criticised in Solomon . 
.ruf11'a note 83, at 523-28. 
no 308 U.S. -198, 1199 ( 1940). 
"'Brief for Appellee at 15, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2J 
901 (4th Cir. 1965); Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 66-2 USTC 1]9589 
(E.D. Va. 1963). 
"'See also Treas. Reg.§ l.l371-l(c)(2)(ii). 
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The major developments in the preparatory doctrine after Richmond 
Television have been many: 
( 1) Employees have come to be regarded as being engaged in a trade 
or business that is broader than their particular job. The result is that 
an employee's expenses of investigating a job or position similar to the 
one currently or recently held are deductible on the ground that they are 
incidental to his existing trade or business rather than being preparatory 
to entering a new job."3 This concept may also be seen in the 1967 shift 
in the educational expense regulations. There the Treasury has aban-
doned the former "new position" nondeductibility test in favor of nar· 
rowing the nondeductible category of education expenses to those which 
would lead to qualification of the taxpayer for a new trade or business."' 
( 2) A trade or business status may continue during a hiatus, so that 
expenses of resuming it are not nondeductible pre-operating expenses."" 
( 3) The deduction of investigatory and pre-operating expenditures 
has been permitted where they can be viewed as related to another trade 
or business. For instance, section 174 authorities permit deduction of 
R & D expenditures connected with any trade or business (and not 
just one relating to invention activities) . "n 
( 4) The pre-operating expense concept of Richmond Tele11i.rion has 
been rejected in more recent farm loss cases. 117 
( 5) Recent decisions have begun increasingly to rely upon the hold-
ing one's self out rationale as the foundation for the pre-operating ex-
pense doctrine.ns For purposes of analysis of Snow, the latter three de-
93 David ]. Primuth, 54 T.C. 3 74 ( 1970); accord, Leonard C. Black, 60 T.C. 108 
(1973); Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219 (1972); Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 
(1970); Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970). See Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment 
of Business and Employment Investigatory ExfmJSes, 56 MINN. L. REV. 1157, 1166-67, 
1172-75 ( 1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Int,estigatory Expenses). 
94 Treas. Reg.§ 1.162-5(b)(3). See Lee, Command Performance: The Tax Treat-
ment of Employer Mandated Expe~~ses, 7 RICHMOND L. REV. 1, 34-36 ( 1972). 
95 See, e.g., Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 1, 6 ( 1963). The same principle is at work in 
the net operating loss authorities holding that a temporary suspension of a corpora-
tion's business does not of itself constitute a failure to carry on substantially the same 
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(d)-1(n) (6) example 2; Glover Packing Co. v. United 
States, 328 F.2d 342, 348 (Ct. Cl. 1964); cf. Penton v. United States, 259 F.2d 536 
(6th Cir. 1958). See generally Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Sepa-
rations Under Section 355 After Rafferty, 27 TAX L. REv. 453, 470 n.66 ( 1972). The 
hiatus situation has occurred most frequently in the context of educational expenses. 
See Furner v. Comm'r, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); John C. Ford, 56 T.C. 1300, 
1304 (1971), aff'd 73-2 USTC 1!9798 ("th Cir. 1973). See J;enerally, Note, llzvesti-
gatory Expenses, supra note 93, at 1170-71. 
96 Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1 ( 1965) (section 174); accord, York v. 
Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958) (section 162); Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 
1277 (1973) (section 174). See generally Note, Investigatory Expenses, supra note 93, 
at 1167-68. 
97 See note 81 sup1·a. 
98 See, e.g., Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCM 52 ( 1973); accord, Snow v. Comm'r, 
-182 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), mt. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3382 (Jan. 7, 1974). 
Cf. McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1961); Herbert R. Barret, 58 T.C. 
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velopments are the most significant, but a broad brush decision by the 
Supreme Court on basis of the meaning of the term "trade or business" 
could have a ripple effect upon all of these trends as well as the over 
sixty Code provisions utilizing some form of the term. The relationship 
to another trade or business aspect is discussed below in Trade or Bllsi-
nes.r Statu.r of a Limited Partner. 
In the farm loss area, the Government has attempted to apply a pre-
operating expense doctrine under the rationale that, in developing his 
agricultural commodities, the taxpayer is amassing capital assets prepara-
tory to entering the farming business. Recent farm loss decisions have 
rejected this approach."" They reason that under the special farm tax 
accounting rules, farmers can elect to deduct currently development ex-
penditures (which resemble start-up or pre-operating costs in other 
industries, since they are incurred before the farmer has a farm com-
modity available for sale, but manifest "ordinary" characteristics since 
they constitute the type of expenditures that must be deducted currently 
once the farm is in full operation), despite their similarity to capital 
expenditures in that they may be viewed as part of the process of acquir-
ing, i.e., growing, a capital asset or asset used in the farmer's trade or 
business. 100 Therefore, any pre-operating expense doctrine based upon an 
amassing of capital assets or increase in earning capacity directly con-
flicted with the theory permitting deduction of development expendi-
tures. Similarly, it may be argued that pre-operating R & D expenditures 
can not be capitalized under any preparatory to engaging in a trade or 
business concept that is founded on an amassing of capital assets or 
increase in earning power rationale. For this was the precise rationale 
espoused by the decisions that section 174 was designed to overrule.10 ' 
In short, where special tax accounting rules permit optional deduction of 
capital expenditures, a taxpayer should not be forced to capitalize them 
284 (1972) (Bruce,]., decided Snow in Tax Court); C. Fink Fisher, 50 T.C. 164, 171 
( 1968) (Featherston, ]., decided Kennedy); Myron E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557, 560 
( 1967). Many district court farm loss decisions illustrate the term "trade or business" 
by declaring that a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business generally holds himself out 
as selling either goods or services. Hicks v. United States, 72-1 USTC 1T 9383 (S.D. 
Miss. 1972); Cavender v. United States, 71-2 USTC 1]'9723 (S.D. W.Va. 1971). This 
broad definition has been described as "inadequate in resolving the variety of factual 
situations which have faced the courts." Martin C. McGowan, 23 TCM 1439, 1442 
(1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1965 ). 
D9Compare Edwin H. Minor, 21 TCM 1173 (1962) and Edward R. Godfrey, 22 
TCM 1 (1963 ), aff'd on other f!.round.r, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), rert. de11ied, 379 
U.S. 966 ( 1965), with Whitman v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 845, 854-55, 892. 
(W.D. La. 1965). See Maple v. Comm'r, ·i40 F.2d 1055. 1056 (9th Cir. 1971). Cf. 
Walter E. Edge, Jr., 32 TCM 1291, 1298 (1973) (history of losses during det;e/op-
meltt period not significant). 
10o Maple v. Comm'r, 440 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1971); Herbert D. Wiener, 
58 T.C. 81, 88 ( 1972); Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 327-28 ( 1964). 
See also United States v. Catto, 284 U.S. 102, 106 ( 1966). 
101 See note 3 7 supra. 
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on the theory that they are capital expenditures, even if that theory 
is dressed up as a preparatory doctrine. If that doctrine is to be ap-
plied to pre-operating R & D expenditures, it must be justified on some 
other rationale, such as a requirement that a trade or business does not 
commence until the taxpayer has goods or services available for sale. 
And if that requirement is erroneous, then application of a preparatory 
to engaging in a trade or business concept to pre-operating R & D ex-
penditures is erroneous as well. 
The genesis of the definition of trade or business as involving "holding 
one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services" is 
a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Deputy v. D1tPont.102 
There, however, the Supreme Court was engaged in distinguishing be-
tween trade or business expenditures and investment or "non-business" 
expenditures later made deductible under the predecessor to section 212. 
For example, an investor in securities, in managing his own investments, 
does not provide services to another; services are rendered or goods are 
sold only through the business activities of the corporation, a separate 
tax entity, whose securities the investor holds. 10" Thus be is at the end 
of the investment economic chain and neither creates a market nor 
provides services to anotber. 10' Accordingly, it is significant that Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter preceded his "holding out" definition with the 
observation that active concern over one's financial interest, i.e., invest-
ments, did not constitute a trade or business. By way of contrast, the pre-
operating enterprise ultimately will hold itself out as providing goods or 
services. Indeed, there is no inherent reason why a taxpayer should not 
satisfy Mr. Justice Frankfurter's definition if he has a present intent to 
hold himself out at some future date when goods will be ready for sale. 10" 
The alternatives in the tax treatment of pre-operating expenses are 
current deduction or capitalization. Yet the original "holding one's self 
out" doctrine as promulgated in Dep11ty I'. D11Pont was not intended 
to make this distinction but was intended instead to distinguish between 
expenses which were deductible under the predecessor to section 162 
and those which, prior to the enactment of the predecessor to section 
212, were simply nondeductible. As the oft-cited decision of the Second 
Circuit in Trent 11. C omm i.r.riouer points out: 
102 302 U.S. -188,-199 (19-10) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion). 
10
" See Lee, "ActitJe Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Real 
Estate Bu.rine.r.r, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 323 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lee, "ActitJe 
Conduct"}. 
101 See Achille 0. Van Suetendael, 3 TCM 987 (191-1), aff'd mem., 152 F.2d 651 
( 2d Cir. 1915). See al.ro Saunders, "Trade or Busine.r.r," Its Meaning Under the In-
ternal Rer,enue Code, 12 So. CAL. INST. ON FED. TAX. 693 ( 1960). 
1or. Section 1.513-1 (b) of the regulations, which declares that it is following the 
meaning of "trade or business" under section 162, states that generally the term 
"includes any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods 
or performance of services." A production of income purpose does not normally require 
current income. Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-l(b). Cf. Treas. Reg.§ 1.212-1(b). 
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Throughout the Internal Revenue Code there runs a distinction 
between those expenses and losses incident to the endeavor to earn 
a livelihood by "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the 
selling of goods or services," Deputy v. DuPont, 1940, 308 U.S. 
488, 499, 60 S. Ct. 363, 369, 84 L. Ed. 416 (concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), those incident to other activities that 
are pecuniarily motivated, Higgins v. C.I.R., 1941, 312 U.S. 212, 
61 S. Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783, and those incident to activities that are 
not. Deductions of the first class are usually allowed fully, some of 
the second and third only under limitations, and some, especially 
of the third class, not at alJ.1°6 
399 
In short, the "holding one's self out" definition was intended to dis-
tinguish between a trade or business and investment activities, and not 
to determine when a trade or business had commenced. Following 
Deputy 11. D11Pont faithfully, the taxpayer in the pre-operating enter-
prise, who as yet has no products to offer, incurs his "ordinary" expenses 
for the production of income (section 212 does not require current 
income) .107 Assuming, as most commentators do, that a corporation's 
trade or business encompasses investment activities, 108 the only areas in 
which the failure to hold one's self out would ever be determinative as 
to deductibility of pre-operating expenses, if a valid prerequisite, are 
those provisions which only incorporate the trade or business standard 
of section 162, but not the production of income criterion of section 212, 
and, then, only as to individuals. The inconsistency in permitting a 
corporation to deduct its pre-operating R & D expenses while preclud-
lor. 291 F.2d 669,670-71 (2d Cir. 1961). 
1 0 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l(b); Rev. Rul. 74-28, 1974-3 l.R.B. 7. See S. REP. No. 
1631, 77th Cong, 2d Sess., 87 (1942). Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511, 514 (1953). 
disallowed investigating expense claimed in the alternative under the predecessor to 
section 212 on the grounds that "[t)here is a basic distinction between allowing deduc-
tions for the expense of producing or collecting income, in which one has an existent 
interest or right, and expenses incurred in an attempt to obtain income by the creation 
of some new interest." This "existing interest" rule has been severely criticized. See 
Fleischer, supra note 35, at 581-84. But in any event, the taxpayer, once he has made 
the firm decision to enter a new business and taken steps towards that goal, has the 
requisite existing interest in his pre-operating business so that section 212 is applicable. 
Moreover, any other rule would leave a taxpayer in the non-business, non-deductibility 
limbo that section 212 was designed to /ill. Finally, the Tax Court recently allowed a 
deduction for a would-be author's preparatory expenses under section 212 while deny-
ing that the taxpayer was yet engaged in the trade or business of being an author. 
Marian B. S. Crymes, 31 TCM 4 ( 1972). 
lOS See BITIKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 232 (4th 
ed. 1972); BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS \[5.03, n.8 (3d ed. 1971): "During the 1942 hearings on § 212, a tax-
payer representative recommended its enlargement to include corporations. The rec-
ommendation was not adopted, probably because it was thought to be unnecessary. At 
any rate, it has been generally assumed since 1942 that a corporation can deduct under 
§ 162(a) any expenses that could be deducted under § 212 by an individual. ... " 
But cf. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 908 (4th Cir. 1965), 
tJacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965) (section 212 
inapplicable to corporations). 
Tax lAw)'er, Vol. 27, No. 3 
400 SECTION OF TAXATION 
ing an individual in similar circumstances from deducting his R & D 
expenses, although under section 212 he could deduct "ordinary" or 
non-capital pre-operating expenses such as advertising, illustrates the 
absurdity of basing the test for determining when a business com-
mences on the moment that the taxpayer first has products or services 
ready to sell. 
To require a taxpayer to hold himself out to others as selling goods 
or services, particularly when inventing activities are involved, is to 
require in many instances an economic return to be produced currently. 
If the taxpayer must have a commercially acceptable invention to offer, 
he must of necessity have completed his research and experimentation 
before he has entered into the trade or business at issue. Yet in the 
hobby loss area, in which the issue of whether a taxpayer is engaged in a 
trade or business has arisen most frequently, the cases commonly have 
not expressly required the taxpayer to hold himself out to others as 
currently selling goods or services, to have a product ready for sale,10n 
or to produce an immediate economic return. 110 Furthermore, in the 
context of section 17 4, "experimental activity often shows little, if 
any, return during developmental stages. It was to encourage this kind 
of activity that Congress authorized the current deduction of research 
and experimental expenditures." 111 In summary, the "holding one's 
self out to others" rationale is not a supportable basis for the pre-
operating expense doctrine, nor are the other justifications raised from 
time to time in the cases. 11 ~ 
The Solicitor General, in his memorandum in opposition to the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in Snow, asserted, as had the Commissioner 
in the Tax Court below, that the partnership "which had no plant, no 
separate office or facility, no telephone and no marketing activity during 
the year in question, did not meet the accepted definition of a 'trade or 
10n See, e.g., Mercer v. Comm'r, 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967); Whitman v. United 
States, 248 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. La. 1968) (no sales of cattle during developmental 
period); DuBose v. Ross, 66-2 USTC 1!9672 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (in growing timber 
no receipts until pine trees reach a certain stage of development); Harold M. Clark, 
28 TCM 1260 (1969) (no successful crop of Oregon Myrtle bushes in three successive 
years, no gross income); D. Joseph St. Germain, 18 TCM 355 (1959) (tree farm, no 
sales until maturity). Moreover, several decisions treat a failure to hold one's self out 
as selling goods and services as merely a factor which, standing alone, might not nega-
tive any intention to engage in a business activity for profit. Joseph v. Curran, 29 TCM 
696 (1970); see also American Properties, Inc., 28 T.C. 1100, 1112 (1957), aff'd per 
curiam, 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958); James E. Ashe, 26 TCM 791,793 (1967). 
110Eugene]. Magee, 32 TCM 1277, 1279 (1973) (section 174); accord, Margit 
Sigray Bessengey, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), aff'd, 379 F.2d 931 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) (leading Tax Court farm loss decision); Johan A. Louw, 
30 TCM 1421 ( 1971) (section 174). See generally Note, ltwestigatory Exfmzses, supra 
note 93, at 1161-62. 
111 Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277, 1279 (1973). 
112 See note 53 supra. 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 27, No. 3 
WILL SNOW FALL? 401 
business.' " 113 The Service frequently has pointed to similar facts in 
asserting that a corporation was not engaged in an active trade or 
business.111 The uniform judicial response has been that a business 
may be conducted through agents and the crucial question is whether 
the taxpayer bears the economic risk of the activity.115 In 1966, the 
partnership in Snow paid for 500 hours of management services per-
formed largely by its 50 percent general partner (who also had a 34 per-
cent interest as a limited partner) . In addition the partnership paid for 
substantial R & 0 services performed by a corporation that carried on 
machining and fabrication shopwork.Un Thus, the partnership was 
engaged in a trade or business under the above standard, through the 
activities of its agents who performed the R & 0 on its behalf. Further-
more, the regulations apply section 174 to R & 0 carried out on behalf 
of the taxpayer by a research institute, foundation, engineering com-
pany, or similar contractor.U' Consequently, affirmance by the Supreme 
Court on this ground could provoke a flood of litigation under provi-
sions such as sections 61, 355,482 and 921(a), where existing case 
law attributes business activities of an agent to his principal. 
Since Deputy 11. DuPont does not, and was never intended to, provide 
guidelines as to when a trade or business commences, but only as to 
whether business or investment activities are involved, guidance must 
be sought elsewhere. Numerous provisions in the regulations state that 
a corporation commences its business as soon as its activities have ad-
vanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its business 
operations, e.g., acquisition of the necessary operating assets. 118 Thus, 
113 Memorandum for Respondent in Opposition to Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 
6, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 846 
(Jan. 7, 1974) (No. 73-641); Brief for Respondent at 28-29, 35, 41 Edwin A. Snow, 
58 T.C. 585 ( 1972). See Brief for Appellee at 15, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 
(6th Cir. 1973). 
114 Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D. Mont. 1971) (section 355 
active business test is met despite absence of telephone, separate business address, and 
advertising; was not held out to third persons as a separate emity) ; American Savings 
Bank, 56 T.C. 828, 839 ( 1971) (similar facts not dispositive where business conducted 
through agents). 
1 15 See, e.g., Frank v. Int'l Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962) (section 
921(2) ); United States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 
1969), •·ev'd on othe1· grounds, 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971) (section 921(2)); 
American Savings Bank, 56 T.C. 828, 839 ( 1971) (section 61); Barber-Greene Amer-
icas, Inc., 35 T.C. 365, 387-88 (1960). See generally Lee, "Acti11e Conduct", supra 
note 103, at 330-31. Thus, the Commissioner's argument that "[t)he only activity 
which can be characterized as 'business' was the action taken by Burns to have Crossbow, 
Inc. perform the research and development work on the incinerator concept," misses the 
mark. Brief for Respondent at 34-35. Edwin A. Snow, 58 T.C. 585 ( 1971). 
116 58 T.C. at 590-91. 
117 Treas. Reg.§ 1.174-2(a) (2). 
11BE.g., Treas. Reg. §§1.248-1(a)(3) and 1.1371-1(c)(2)(ii). See Mandell, 
Deductibility of Pre-Operating Expenses: Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures, 
25 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1235, 1235-36, 1246 (1967) (hereinafter cited as 
Mandell); Note, l!westigatory Expenses, supra note 93, at 1164 n.28. This objective 
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the conduct of a restaurant business can commence in the taxable year 
in which construction of the restaurant facility is undertaken or when 
real property is purchased or leased for such use. 119 While the Service 
has ruled that investigatory expenses in search of a campsite for a 
proprietary boys' camp, and promotional expenses incurred prior to sign-
ing the lease, were preparatory capital expenditures, 1 ~0 it has also ruled 
(possibly under the rationale that a firm decision had already been 
made) that developmental planning, negotiating for financing, and 
readying of property for construction constitutes being engaged in the 
active conduct of a trade or business.'~' The Solicitor General argued in 
opposition to the granting of a writ of certiorari in Snow that "(t]he 
term 'trade or business' has a single meaning in all sections of the 
Code."'~~ Logically then, the point in time when a business commences 
should be determined from the same factors under all sections of the 
Code. The regulations consistently look at the objective facts which 
establish the character of the business and not at whether the corporate 
taxpayer holds itself out to others as c11rrently providing goods or ser-
vices. These factors, therefore, should be followed in all Code sections 
in which the term "trade or business" appears. Under these authorities, 
the partnership's inventing business in Snow had commenced in 1966. 
Furthermore, the Tax Court stated that the R & D expenditures were 
profit-motivated, 123 and the facts manifest sufficient continuity by the 
identification approach is closely paralleled by the "commitment to the business venture" 
trend in the transaction entered into for profit area, discussed in Wilberding, supra 
note 16. The first explicit judicial consideration given to Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1 (a) (3) 
subsequent to the opinion in Richmond Telet,ision was in an individual hobby loss 
case, Justin A. McNamara, 32 TCM 11, 16 (1973 ), where the taxpayer unjustifiably 
relied upon the regulation as relevant to profit motive and the court broadly dismissed 
its relevance as to whether an individual has commenced a trade or business assuming 
that the prerequisites of profit motive and continuity are met. 
110 Treas. Reg.§§ 1.955-5(a) (3) and 1.1372-4(b) (5) (ii) (b). 
1~o Rev. Rul. 73-421, 1973-42 I.R.B. 7. 
1~t Rev. Rul. 72-220, 1972-1 C.B. 365. 
1 ~2 Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Snow 
v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973 ), cert. /!,rauted, 94 S. Ct. 846 (Jan. 7, 
1974) (No. 73-641). The taxpayer pointed out to the Sixth Circuit that, in the legisla-
tive history of section 513, the provision relied upon for that statement [Cooper Tire & 
Rubber Co. Employees' Retirement Fund v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 96 (1961), aff'd per 
curiam, 306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962)], specifically referred to section 162 for the con-
tent of the term "trade or business." Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Snow v. Comm'r. 
482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973). 
1 ~~ The headnote in Edwin A. Snow, which is usually prepared by the Tax Court 
judge who decides the case, states that each of the three limited partnerships was 
formed to carry on R & D upon a particular invention "with a view to profit." Prior to 
1970 a corporation was organized to produce and market the leaf burner invention of 
Burns. 58 T.C. at 591. Neither the Tax Court nor the Sixth Circuit opinion discloses 
whether the invention was licensed by the partnership to the corporation or transferred 
to it in a tax-free exchange. If the latter, and the taxpayer had always intended an 
incorporation of the invention when perfected (to deflect ordinary income to a lower-
bracket taxpayer), he would have had no intent to realize a direct profit from operation 
of the invention. However, profit for this purpose encompasses unrealized appreciation 
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partnership through its agent to satisfy the traditional trade or business 
criteria. It is well established that sustained and profit-motivated inven-
tive activities constitute a trade or business, separate and apart from the 
business of commercially exploiting an invention.'~' In short, the part-
nership was engaged in the trade or business of inventing with which the 
claimed R & D expenses were connected. 
TRADE OR BUSINESS STATUS OF A LIMITED PARTNER 
The taxpayer in Snou• argued in the Tax Court that he actively par-
ticipated in the R & D and overall management of all three partner-
ships and (a) that as a member of such partnerships, he held developed 
products for sale or licensing, and (b) by virtue of his participation in 
such partnerships, he was engaged in the business of developing and 
obtaining patents on new products for commercial exploitation. 125 The 
Tax Court acknowledged that an individual may be engaged in a busi-
ness by .being a partner in such business, but it apparently concluded 
that the first two partnerships had not progressed into a trade or busi-
ness status because there were no sales or evidence of efforts to sell 
(but cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (-1) ), and presumably the value of the stock in the 
new corporation would reflect the value of the invention, and, if in excess of the tax-
payer's R & D write-offs, would satisfy the profit-motive test under sections 162, 212 
and 183. Yet if the taxpayer's intention had always been to ultimately possess valuable 
appreciated stock in a corporation owning the leaf burner invention, the Service could 
have argued that the claimed R & D expenditure constituted the "acquisition cost" of 
such stock and therefore a capital expenditure. Cf. George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688. 
697-98 ( 1969), alf'd, ·120 F.2d 'l90 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally Allington, Farming 
as a Tax Shelter. 1·1 S.D. L. REV. 181, 202-05 (1969); Young. The Role of Motir•e in 
Er•aluating Tax Sheltered lnr•estments, 22 TAx LAWYER 275, 283-81i (1968). 
In Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCJ\.f 53, 55 ( 1973). Judge Featherston similarlr 
reasoned that a shareholder's "pre-opening expenditures were incurred in creating a 
business which would ultimately produce inrome taxable to Riverside (his subsequently 
formed corporation) after incorporation. These expenditures, therefore. should be 
treated as contributions to the capital of Riverside and reflected in the basis of the 
corporation's stock." Assuming that this is a valid approach. the Court would have to 
remand Snow to determine whether the taxpayer (and possibly a majority in interest of 
the other partners as well) had an intent from the beginning to incorporate, so that it 
may be reasoned that he incurred the R & D expenditures to acquire the stock. On the 
one hand, it is clear that the taxpayer or the limited partnership had sophisticated 
advance tax planning, e.g.; in practical effect there was a special allocation of the 
R & D deductions to the "moneymen" limited partners since initial losses were allo-
cated according to contributed cash capital with a charge back of income, see Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.701-1(b) (2) (example 5). Thus. the taxpayer, a four percent limited partner. 
was allocated 25 percent of the R & D deductions in 1966. 58 T.C. at 590-91. On the 
other hand, the taxpayer was only a four percent limited partner. The general partner 
who had an 8·1 percent interest in the partnership. probably had the determinative say 
on such matters. 
12·1 Johan A. Louw, 30 TCM 1121 (1971); accord, Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277 
( 1973). 
'""Reply brief for Petitioners at 12-13, Brief for Petitioners at 29-30, Edwin A. 
Snow, 58 T.C. 585 ( 1972). 
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their inventions in 1966.'"" The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, 
shifted ground and concluded that the taxpayer's management and ad-
visory activities as to the three partnerships were not sufficiently con-
tinuous or regular to constitute carrying on a trade or business.127 It 
further relied upon Whipple u. Commissioner '"8 as precluding the tax-
payer from being engaged in a trade or business as an investor in 
inventions. 
The shortcomings in the Sixth Circuit's reasoning are numerous. 
Under its equation of "holding one's self out" with "having a product to 
offer," the first two partnerships were probably engaged in the trade or 
business of developing inventions. Some decisions hold that a partner, 
including a limited partner, is engaged in the trade or business of his 
partnership because its activities are carried out on his behalf, and, 
. therefore, imputed to him. ' 2 " This principle would distinguish W hippie, 
which in essence rests on the doctrine that a corporation and its share-
holders are distinct tax entities and a shareholder is not engaged in the 
trade or business of his corporation. The Tax Court so held in A. L. 
Stanchfield.' 30 Thus, the taxpayer was arguably engaged in the invention 
business carried on by the first two partnerships. Furthermore, R & D 
expenditures for a new product, such as the trash burner developed by 
the third partnership, may be deducted as incurred in connection with 
the trade or business of developing other inventions or products. Con-
sequently, the taxpayer's argument that he individually was engaged in a 
trade or business deserved better consideration than the Sixth Circuit's 
W hippie analysis. 
This line of argument does, however, raise two further significant 
issues: ( 1) is a partnership's trade or business status imputed to the 
partners, or does partnership profit or loss merely maintain the same 
trade or business status for tax return purposes in the partner's hands as 
it had in the hands of the partnership, and ( 2) assuming that a partner 
has obtained trade or business status either through attribution from 
another partnership, or independently through his own individual activi-
126 58 T.C. 585, 596 ( 1972). The Tax Court apparently ignored its own finding 
that in 1966 the products of the other two partnerships had been developed to the stage 
of being ready for sale, that the partners hoped to license some manufacturers to build 
and market them, and that a patent on one of the products was filed in 1966. Id. at 588. 
Furthermore, the Government did not disallow the 1966 R & D expenses of the other 
two partnerships. Id. at 592. 
12; 482 F.2d 1029, 1033 ( 1973). 
1 28 373 u.s. 193 (1963). 
129 Harding v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1953); George A. Butler, 
36 T.C. 1097, 1106 ( 1961) (limited partner); Darwin 0. Nichols, 29 T.C. 1140, 
1145 ( 1958); Nate Kazdin, 28 TCM 432 ( 1969). See gmerally Lee, "Active Co11duct," 
supra note 103, at 322. But see Young, l11come Tax Co11seque11ces of l1111estment Losses 
of Individuals, 27 TAX L. REV. 1, 26-28 ( 1971). 
130 24 TCM 1681 ( 1965). See gmerally Lee, "Actiz1e Co11duct," supra note 103, at 
323. . 
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ties, does this status affect the character of his distributive share of 
partnership income or loss which, in the hands of his partnership or in 
the hands of another partner, would not be incurred or earned in a 
trade or business? The answers to these two inquiries have consequences 
in contexts other than section 174. For example, a question has cur-
rently been raised whether profit motive for purposes of section 183 is 
determined at the partnership or partner level.'"' If the former, would 
a partner's motive override that of his partnership? Commentators have 
also frequently discussed whether a taxpayer who is a dealer, for ex-
ample, in real estate may obtain capital gains treatment for a sale by a 
non-dealer partnership in which he is a partner.m These issues m 
essence turn on the competing "entity" and "aggregate" theories of 
partnership taxation, which the Supreme Court recently declined to 
address in Basye.'"" 
The question is usually stated as whether character of income is to be 
determined at the partnership or partner level. Section 702 (b) pro-
vides that the character of income or loss included in a partner's dis-
tributive share of such income or loss which he reports separately in his 
individual return shall be determined "as if such item were realized 
directly from the source from which realized by the partnership, or 
incurred in the same manner as incurred by the partnership." Un-
fortunately, this ambiguous language does not meet the source of the 
problem; namely, whether for this purpose, the partnership is to be 
treated as an "entity" or an "aggregate" of individual partners. If the 
former, character would be determined at the partnership level and con-
tinue into the individual partner's hands under the transmission or 
"conduit" approach of section 702 (b). If the latter, character would 
be determined as if the partner realized the item directly, apart from 
the partnership. While the "aggregate" theory is also referred to as 
the "conduit" approach, use of the latter term is confusing since it also 
refers to the transmission of the taxpaying obligation to the individual 
partners.134 Thus, to say as the Supreme Court recently did in United 
States v. Basye that "partnerships are entities for purposes of calculat-
ing and filing informational returns, but that they are conduits through 
which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in 
1 31 See, e.g., Prospectus, DLJ PROPERTIES/73, 46 (Oct. 18, 1973) ("Although the 
Internal Revenue has never indicated that section 183 is applicable to limited partners, 
it is conceivable that it may take such a position notwithstanding any 'profit objective' 
which the partnership may be deemed to have"). Cf. Valentine Howell, 41 T.C. 13, 
17,19 (1963) aff'd, 332 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1964). 
132 See, e.g., Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Partnership lncome-
"E,Itity" v. "Conduit" Principle i11 Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. 
TAx. 287, 292 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Wolfman). 
1 33 United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973). 
1 34 Wolfman, supra note 132, at 289-92. 
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accord with their distributive shares" 135 does not signify at which level 
character of income or trade or business status is to be determined. 
As noted above, a hypothetical often posed by commentators is that 
of a real estate dealer who is a partner in a partnership that would qualify 
for capital gains treatment if character were determined solely at the 
partnership level. Under the entity theory, the partner would have capi-
tal gain; but under the aggregate theory, he has ordinary income. The 
legislative history to section 702 (b) is somewhat contradictory, but on 
the whole, appears to adopt an aggregate approach.""; The General 
Explanation in the Committee reports takes the entity approach, stating 
that "items required to be segregated will retain their original character 
in the hands of the partner as though they were realized directly by him 
from the same source from which realized by the partnership and in the 
same manner." m The Technical Explanation, on the other hand, 
seems to take an aggregate approach, stating that " [ s J ubsection (b) 
contains a 'conduit' rule which makes clear that the character of any 
item realized by the partnership and included in a partner's distributive 
share shall be the same as though he had realized .wch item directly, 
1·ather than thro11gh his membership in a partnership, from the source 
from which it was realized by the partnership and in the same man-
ner." 1 ~" Counterbalancing this expression of the Congressional intent 
is the fact that section 702 (a) speaks of the partner's distributive share 
of "the partmr.rhip' s" various items of gain or loss, and subsection (b) 
refers to the character of the items listed in subsection (a). A partner-
ship could have items of gain or loss only under an entity theory. 139 
The regulations seem to determine character at the partnership level, 
with such income or loss retaining the same character in the hands of 
the partner_,..o Moreover, on occasion the Service has expressly an-
nounced that character of an item of income or loss is determined at the 
"" tj I 0 U.S. tjtj I, 118 n.8 ( 1973). In text accompanying the footnote, the Court 
explained that: 
[W]hile the partnership itself pays no taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 701, it must report 
the income it generates and such income must be calculated in largely the 
same manner as an individual computes his personal income. For this purpose, 
then, the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart 
from the aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and re-
ported, its existence may be disregarded since each partner must pay a tax on a 
portion of the total income as if the partnership were merely an agent or 
conduit through which the income passed. 
1
"" Anderson & Coffee, ProfJosed Ret,i.rion of Partnet· and PartnershifJ Taxation: 
Anttlysi.r of the RefJort of the Adt,isory GroufJ 011 SubchafJter K (First Installment), 
I 5 TAx. L. REV. 285, 29 I ( 1960) [hereinafter cited as Anderson & Coffee); Wolfman, 
.ruf'r<l note 132 at 291. 
107 H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1951) (emphasis added); accord, 
S. REP. No. I 622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 89 ( 195·1). 
'""H. R. REP. No. 1337, S3d Cong., 2d Sess., A222 (1951) (emphasis added); 
aCtwd, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 377-78 (1951). 
139 Anderson & Coffee, .rufJra note 136, at 291; Wolfman, supra note 132, at 291. 
140 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (b). 
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partnership level, w and in litigation has argued for that result where a 
partner, if realizing a gain directly, would be entitled to capital gains 
treatment. 142 But it appears that the Government argues for the aggre-
gate theory as well, where to do so is to its temporary advantage.143 This 
may well be part of the reason why the matter was still being discussed 
in 1972 before the Supreme Court in Basye.w A number of recent 
decisions, relying upon language in section 702 (a) referring to the 
"partnership's" gains or losses, have determined character of income at 
the partnership level, where the partnership was a dealer in the prop-
erty sold but the taxpayer partner was not and the issue was whether to 
allow the partner capital gains treatment. 145 
Under the entity approach, in order for the taxpayer in Snow to de-
duct his distributive share of the R & D incurred by the third partnership 
on its trash burner, the partnership would have to be engaged in the 
trade or business of inventing in 1966. Under the aggregate theory by 
itself, the taxpayer would probably not be able to deduct the R & D 
since both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit held that his individual 
activities did not qualify as a trade or business. While the Government 
has usually argued for the entity approach to section 702 (b), it may 
advocate before the Supreme Court in Snow adoption of an aggregate 
approach. The Solicitor General's memorandum in opposition to the 
petition for a writ of certiorari in Snow raised the following arguments: 
During the year in question, the partnership, in which petitioner 
was merely an investor, was not holding itself out to others as 
engaged in the selling of goods and services . 
. . . Thus, the aim of section 17 4 was to equalize the treatment of 
small business vis-a-vis large businesses and not, as petitioner asserts 
(Pet. 9-12), to extend the deduction to mere investors who cannot 
meet the "trade or business" qualification.H6 
The description of investor hardly fits the partnership, and as applied 
to the limited partner, is relevant only under an aggregate approach. The 
Government's Brief in the Sixth Circuit manifests that its investment 
intent argument rests on determination of trade or business status at the 
partner level. The Commissioner asserted there that the vehicle of a 
partnership "permitted the limited partners to engage in private invest-
ments while strictly limiting their liability, thus avoiding the risks cus-
Hl Rev. Rul. 68·79, 1968-1 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 67-188, 1967-1 C.B. 216. 
142 See, e.g., Barham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 43, 45, 46 (M.D. Ga. 1969), 
aff'd mem., 429 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970); Hyman Podell, 55 T.C. 429, 432-33 (1970). 
lH See note 147 infra. 
14
• See note 135 supra. 
145 See note 142 supra. 
146 Memorandum for Respondent in Opposition in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 
ti-5, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. };ranted, 94 S. Ct 846 (Jan. 
7, 1974) (No. 73-641). 
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tomarily attendant to trade or business activities." ].1 7 Thus, the Govern-
ment was implicitly arguing for the aggregate approach. 
Many decisions under the 1939 and 1954 Codes impute partnership 
business activities to the partners, including limited partners, so that 
they are engaged in the same business as their partnership. Hs The ra-
tionale is that a partnership acts only on behalf of the partners, and 
that trade or business activities of an agent are imputed to his principal 
in determining the latter's business.''" The Advisory Group on Sub-
chapter K viewed the imputation doctrine as a corollary to the aggregate 
approach, stating in 195 7 that: 
Although the character of the income items is to be determined at 
the partner level, account must be taken of the fact that the partner-
ship is acting for the partners and thus that they are engaged in 
whatever business the partnership is. Thus, where there is a sale 
of property being used in a trade or business at the level of the 
partnership . . . the partnership character of any gain from such a 
sale would be attributed to the partners since they individually would 
be considered as engaged in the partnership business.t"0 
Under the aggregate-imputation approach it could be argued that the 
taxpayer in Snow was engaged in the business of inventing through im-
putation from the first two limited partnerships, which had inventions 
ready to offer for licensing or sale in 1966, and thus his distributive 
share of the third partnership's R & D losses would be deductible by him 
under the aggregate approach to section 702 (b). While the Tax Court 
held in George A. B11tler "" that a limited partner was engaged in the 
trade or business conducted by his partnership, a commentator has 
concluded that B11tler would not seem to support a rule that a partner is 
always engaged in the trade or business of his partnership. 152 Since the 
imputation concept is not derived directly from section 702, but is based 
upon the principle that a taxpayer may conduct a business solely through 
activities of an agent, whether a partner is engaged in the business of 
his partnership should be resolved on the basis of analogy to principles 
of agency law. If a partner, general or limited, exercises sufficient con-
147 Brief for Appellee at 14-15, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973). 
148 1939 Code: Flood v. United States, 133 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1943); Harding v. 
United States, 113 F. Supp. 462 (Ct. Cl. 1953); George A. Butler, 36 T.C. 1097 
(1961) (limited partner). 1954 Code: Nate Kazdin, 28 TCM 432 (1969); see 
A. L. Stanchfield, 24 TCM 1681 (1965). But cf. Boone v. United States, 74-1 USTC 
1[9180 (D.N. Dak. 1973). 
140 ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER K OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 
1954, REVISED REPORT ON PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 7·8 ( 1957) (hereinafter 
cited as Advisory Group). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A (1957). 
Cf. Inez de Amodio, 34 T.C. 894, 902 (1960), alf'd, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962). 
150 Advisory Group, supra note 149. 
151 36T.C.1097, 1106 (1961). 
152 Young, Income Tax Consequences of Investment Losses of Individuals, 27 TAX 
l. REV. 1, 26-7 (1971). 
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trol over the partnership, or has such authority that it acts as his agent, 
then the partnership business activities should be imputed to the partner 
in determining whether he is engaged in the trade or business con-
ducted by the partnership.153 The reported facts do not disclose whether 
the taxpayer in Snow exercised such control over the first two partnerships 
or had the right to do so. Furthermore, his interests in these two partner-
ships appear to have been only that of a trustee. 
It is submitted that the "entity" approach should apply here, and that 
the imputation theory is inconsistent with the entity approach. Viewing 
the partnership as a separate entity with character of income deter-
mined at the partnership level and under the conduit approach such 
character together with the tax liability being transmitted to the partner, 
the trade or business of the partqership should not be imputed to the 
partner, just as a corporation's business as a separate entity is not 
imputed to its shareholders. Under this approach, the Sixth Circuit's 
reliance upon lf/ hippie was not erroneous, but there is no indication 
that the appellate court was even aware of the entity versus aggregate 
issue. Should the aggregate approach prevail, however, as to character-
ization of income under section 704, then the imputation doctrine should 
apply as well. For if a partnership is only an aggregate of individuals for 
this purpose, it in effect acts only on their behalf and is their agent. 
Therefore, determining trade or business status at the partner level, 
the premise of the Commissioner's investment arguments in Snow, re-
quires consideration of the imputation theory as well. Only the Supreme 
Court or Congress can now resolve whether the "entity" or "aggregate" 
approach is to apply here. The legislative history, a slight majority of 
commentators, and the imputation cases militate towards the aggregate 
approach. But the language of section 702 (a) and the recent decisions 
relying on that language hold for an entity approach. The Government 
has blown both hot and cold for the entity approach, albeit heretofore 
usually hot. 
TAX SHELTER MOTIVE 
The Sixth Circuit in Snow noted that the taxpayer had income in 
1966 in excess of $200,000, so that his investment in the partnership 
was made as a high bracket taxpayer. It then concluded that two laud-
able public purposes were therefore in direct conflict: ( 1) stimulation 
of R & D by inventors and small businessmen, and ( 2) "the desirability 
of strict interpretation of tax laws so as to prevent unintended tax shel-
ters." 15'1 As shown in the preceding sections, not just strict, but 
erroneous interpretation as well of section 174 is necessary to support the 
1 53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 2(1), 14, 220(2) (1957). Cf. Voss 
v. United States, 329 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1964). 
154 482 F.2d 1031. 
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result reached in Snow. The Government's arguments to the Fourth 
Circuit in Richmond T elel'iJion were more explicit. There it asserted 
that the expenses at issue were not expected to produce income in the 
years incurred and that to charge them off (through net operating loss 
deductions) against the income of a single year would result in a gross 
distortion of that year's income.w· The Fourth Circuit accepted this 
argument as the basis for its alternative capitalization holding.156 The 
Government did not seem bothered by the fact that capitalization of pre-
operating expenses frequently results, as was the case in Richmond T ele-
viJion, in equal distortion of income. There, deduction or amortization 
of such capitalized expenditure was deferred indefinitely, and in many 
instances capitalized start-up costs would be amortized at best over a long 
duration unrelated to the period in which they produced income. 
It appears clear from Richmond TeleuiJion and Snow that the desire 
to match deductions with related future expected income underlies the 
Government's attack on pre-operating or start-up costs.157 The goal 
appears laudable: a tax shelter deduction, or "accelerated deduction" in 
the terminology of the Administration's 1973 proposals for tax reform, 
consists of "a deduction which clearly relates to some future expected 
profit and has little or no relation to income reported in the current 
year." 158 But there is currently no overt tax principle that requires a 
matching of related income and deductions, and the remedy of capitaliza-
155 Brief for Appellant at 13, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 
901 (4th Cir. 1965). 
156 Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), 
11acated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965). 
1 5 7 The same policy apparently underlies recent threatened application of the "profit 
motive" test to tax shelters. See Remarks by the Honorable Donald C. Alexander, 
27 TAx LAWYER 173 (1974). Indeed, the Service often asserts alternative prepara-
tory and hobby loss contentions. See, e.g., Edwin H. Miner, 21 TCM 1173 (1962). 
158 Administration's Proposals for Tax Change with Treasury Explanation 96-97 
( 1973) (hereinafter cited as Proposals for Tax Change]. Technically, the Limitation 
on Artificial Accounting Loss ( "LAL") proposals define an "accelerated deduction" 
as a deduction relating to future expected profit, but unrelated to current income. An 
"artificial accounting loss" is defined as the amount by which accelerated deductions 
exceed "associated net related income" for the taxable year, computed without regard 
to the accelerated deductions. Id. at 97. Since accelerated deductions are allowed up 
to the amount of net related income, the latter becomes a pivotal term. Feinschreiber, 
1973 Tax Reform: The Administration's Proposals, 51 TAXES 398, 399 (1973). In 
disfavored tax shelters it is limited to income from the particular investment or busi-
ness property that is generating the accelerated deduction. For instance, related income 
for non-residential or commercial real estate includes only the rental income from the 
particular property to which the accelerated deductions, such as accelerated depreciation, 
are attributable. Proposals for Tax Change, supra at 99. On the other hand in favored 
tax shelters such as residential real estate or oil and gas drilling, related income in-
cludes rental income from all residential real estate and mineral income from oil and 
gas properties, respectively. Id. at 98-99. The device by which accelerated deductions 
are matched with their related income is the Deferred Loss Account ( "DLA"). An 
artificial accounting loss, or accelerated deduction in excess of net related income, is 
deferred by adding it to the DLA, to be taken as a deduction (and subtracted from the 
DLA) against the first net related income in subsequent tax years or to be taken into 
account upon a sale or other disposition of the property. ld. at 97. This differs from 
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tion, advocated by the Government in Snow and Richmond Television, 
frequently does not achieve equitable results. 
The tax treatment of advertising expenditures perhaps best illustrates 
that income and deductions need not be matched under current law. 
"[C]urrent deductibility has normally been permitted for advertising 
expenditures and for educational expenditures to improve one's skills 
utilized in existing employment, even though there were indications 
that some general benefit would in all probability last beyond the year of 
expenditure."' 1"n Early decisions held that advertising and promotional 
expenditures could not be charged to future years either as deferred 
charges, or by amortization of capital investment, where the taxpayer 
failed to show that the future benefits could be determined precisely 
and were not of indefinite duration. 11' 0 Subsequent cases concluded that 
since advertising expenses could not be capitalized in such circumstances 
and spread over future years, they were properly deducted currently.101 
Recently the Tax Court in Briarcliff Candy Corp. 16" turned back to the 
earlier authority, ignoring the intervening development, to hold that ad-
vertising expenditures which would ordinarily be currently deducted 
must be capitalized when made for the cultivation or development of 
future business. This has been the usual rationale under which the 
Government has sought to capitalize start-up costs. The Second Circuit 
reversed the Tax Court, reasoning that under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Commi.rsioner z·. Lincoln Saz:i11g.r and Loan As.r'n/ 6 " the 
presence of benefits which will be realized in future years is not con-
trolling; " 'many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect 
beyond the taxable year." " 164 
The inappropriateness of capitalization of start-up costs may be seen 
in Richmond T elui.rion, where the taxpayer was permanently deprived 
capitalization in that the deduction is not taken ratably over the life of the asset pro-
ducing the accelerated deduction, but is instead deferred completely until net income 
is generated and then offsets such income in full. The closer analogue would be the 
net operating loss carryover under section 172 (b) (I) (B). without the five year 
limitation. 
!GO David J. Primuth, 5·1 T.C. 37·'1. 382 (1970) (concurring opinion); E. H. She). 
don & Co. v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 195 1i); Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 
25 T.C. -163, 467 (1955); Consolidated Apparel Co., 17 T.C. 1570, 1582 (1952). 
aff'd, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953); Elmer W. Conti, 31 TCM 3-18 (1972); Stanley 
Selig, 26 TCM 1302 ( 1967). 
16°See, e.,;., A Finkenberg's Sons, Inc., 17 T.C. 973,983 (1951); X-Pando Corp., 
7 T.C. -18, 53 ( 1946); F. E. Booth Co., 21 B.T.A. HB, 150· 52 ( 1930); Colonial Ice 
Cream Co., 7 B.T.A. 15-1, 156 ( 1927). Cf. Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6 B.T.A. 12·17, 
1253·5-1 (1927), alf'd, 29 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1928); Northwestern Yeast Co., 5 B.T.A. 
232, 237·38 (1926). 
16 1 Carey Mach. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Hofferber!, 50-2 USTC ~ 9 i21 (D. Md. 
1950); see E. H. Sheldon & Co. v. Comm'r, 21-1 F.2d 655. 659 (6th Cir. 1954); 
Harper & Mcintire Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 588, 589 (D. Iowa 1957). 
162 31 TCM 171, 176 (1972), rerld, 1i75 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). 
16 3 ·103 u.s. 345 ( 1971). 
IG-1 tl75 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit also scored the Tax 
Court decision for its unjust and unequal interpretation of the law in permitting retail-
Tax lAw)'rr, Vol. 27, No. 3 
412 SECTION OF TAXATION 
of the benefits of using such costs in its annual tax equation because 
they were added to the basis of its FCC television license which lacked a 
reasonably ascertainable useful life. 1 " 5 Thus it was left only with an 
increased cost basis, usable when and if ultimately disposed of the 
business or lost the license. Similarly, taxpayers are frequently forced 
to add start-up costs to their stock basis in the corporation which ulti-
mately operates the business.166 Distortion of income can arise as well 
when pre-operating expenses connected with an apartment project, such 
as advertising for initial tenants and management expenses during this 
period, are capitalized since they would probably be spread over the 
useful life of the apartment buildings.167 
In addition to the lack of a sound conceptual framework for capital-
ization of pre-operating expenses and the inappropriateness of capitaliza-
tion itself to match income and expenses, attacking tax shelters through 
pre-operating expense glosses on the term "trade or business" can only 
lead to disturbing and probably unintended side effects throughout the 
tax law in all of the areas noted previously in which preparatory con-
tentions have surfaced in the past: job-seeking expenses, 168 educational 
expenses/ 69 farm losses, 110 start-up costs/ 71 R & 0 expenditures, 112 and 
ers to deduct advertising and promotional expenses, but denying similar tax treatment 
to a wholesaler whose customers are retailers. 475 F.2d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1973). A 
similar case of discriminatory tax treatment between established and beginning businesses 
would arise under Snow. 
165 See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965). 
Surely the majority of those employees trained in 1952 through 1956 were not still 
employed in 1974, but at the date of this writing Richmond Television Corporation 
still has its FCC license and broadcasts without being permitted to amortize or deduct 
one cent of its employee training expense incurred twenty years ago. Frequently, 
"preparatory" or investigatory expenses are attributable to assets without limited lives 
and hence cannot be amortized. Mandell, supra note 118, at 1238. 
tao Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCM 52, 55 ( 1973); see Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 
332 (1953), acquiesced in, 1956·1 C.B. 6, aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); Roy L. 
Harding, 29 TCM 789 ( 1970). See generally Comment, The Deductibility of Pre· 
Incorporation Expenses, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 463 ( 1970). The inequity of such in-
crease in basis has been judicially noted. See Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557, 
568 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCM 52, 55 (1973), which noted that 
some pre-opening expenditures were for assets which subsequently formed corporation 
could depreciate. , 
167 Cf. Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 241 (1959). See generally Hamovit, Construction 
Period Expenses, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1075 ( 1971); Ellen tuck, supra 
note 53, at 899. A "developer" with multiple projects would, however, under the 
York rationale be able to deduct such pre-opening expenses. See Dean, Tax Considera· 
tions and Problems of the Deve/oper-Bui/de,·, 26 N.Y.U. TNST. ON FED. TAx. 209 
(1968); Ellentuck, supra note 53, at 899. 
168 See note 93 supra. 
169 See note 94 supra. 
110 See note 81 supra. 
111 See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965), 
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965); Cleophus L. Kennedy, 




2 See, e.g., John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 (1961). See note 2 supra. 
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the active business requirement of section 3 55.' ;a The effect of a nar-
row definition by the Supreme Court in Snow of "trade or business,'' 
excluding a pre-operating business could be enormous in these areas, 
some of which have only recently arrived at new resolutions of the pre-
paratory to engaging in a trade or business arguments of the Govern-
ment. 
It is clear that section 174 was in part intended to help small busi-
nesses without established research departments, but it may be argued 
that such intent would not extend to instances where there is no busi-
ness at all except for the R & D. In such circumstances, allowance of a 
current deduction under section 174 permits a taxpayer to shelter 
unrelated income and thereby defer payment of income taxes on such 
income until some later date when the process or invention produces 
income that is fully taxed because deduction of the related R & D ex-
penditures, which would otherwise offset such income, instead had been 
accelerated to prior years. Yet it appears that Congress contemplated 
that taxpayers could offset R & D expenditures against substantial income 
from other sources and that a temporary loss of revenue (the deferred 
taxes) would result. Representative Camp's comments on the ABA 
prototype to section 174 pointed out that 
[ m Jerely providing for deductibility of such expenditures probably 
would be satisfactory to most large businesses. However, a small 
business which has unusually large expenditures in connection with 
a research program, or a new or beginning business enterprise, 
must be allowed the right to capitalize such costs and recover them 
by amortization deductions over the estimated useful life, in order 
to insure equality of treatment with large businesses which can 
and usually do deduct the full amounts of such expenditures from 
current income. . . . [I]t is provided that the taxpayer may 
designate the period over which the capitalized costs of a specific re-
search project or undertaking shall be amortized. Any temporary 
loss of revenue resulting from a taxpayer's selection of an unrea-
sonably short amortization period will ordinarily be recovered in 
later years when no amortization deduction will be allowableY" 
Representative Camp appears to have visualized that large corpora-
tions would benefit principally from current deduction of R & D against 
unrelated income. But the interest free loan m arising from the deferral 
of taxes through deducting R & D expenses against current unrelated 
income rather than future related income from the invention was just 
as valuable, for example, to the corporate taxpayer in Best Universal 
H3 Spheeris v. Comm'r, 461 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972). See f!.enerally Lee. Func-
tional Dit,isions and Other ·Corporate SeJJarations Under Secti011 355 After Rafferty, 
27 TAX L. REV. 453,469-471 (1972). 
174 97 CONG. REc. A4326 (1951) (Appendix). 
175 See Calkins & Updegraft, Jr., Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAWYER 493, 507 (1973); 
Proposals for Tax Change, supra note 158, at 16, 95. 
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Lock Co. 176 as it would have been to the individual taxpayer in Snow. 
While the Tax Court thought that the business of the corporation in 
Best Universal Lock Co. included experimentation and efforts to de-
velop new products as well as manufacturing locks, the Service clearly 
did not so limit the decision in Revenue Ruling 71-162 Y 7 If a corpo-
ration which is carrying on inventing activities that are not yet produc-
ing income can offset current unrelated income with its R & D expendi-
tures, then an individual's or partnership's R & D activities which are 
profit-motivated and sufficiently regular and continuous should qualify 
as a "trade or business" as well so that expenditures in connection with 
such activities would be deductible under section 174 against unrelated 
income. 
The narrow construction by the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit in 
Snow of the term "trade or business" would make current deduction by 
an as yet unsuccessful bona fide full-time inventor difficult, if not im-
possible. Yet the legislative history to section 183, enacted in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, manifests an intent that a bona fide inventor be 
entitled to a current deduction even though his expectation of profit 
might be unreasonable.m Under current section 174 the part or full-
time individual inventor, the corporate inventor, and the inventing 
partnership with investor limited partners should all be treated equally 
as to offsetting R & D expenditures against unrelated income. All are 
equally undeserving of interest-free loans from the Government in the 
form of deferral of taxes. If Congress resolves to distinguish between 
these classes of taxpayers, it could easily do so by limiting the current 
deduction privilege to taxpayers with limited amounts of unrelated non-
inventing income. Section 1251 constitutes a close analogy. There Con-
gress reacted to the similar problem of use of accelerated farm deduc-
tions against non-farm income by providing for a limited recapture of 
otherwise capital gains farm gain as ordinary income if an individual 
had offset substantial amounts of farm losses against high bracket non-
farm income. 
Representative Camp in 1951, and presumably Congress in 1954, 
were not unaware of the "temporary" loss of revenue inherent in current 
deduction of R & D expenditures. However, Congress does not appear 
to have been as conscious in 1954 of the permanent loss of revenues from 
"loss interest" during the period taxes are deferred through "artificial 
accounting losses," i.e., accelerated deductions which offset current unre-
lated income.m It is submitted that such revenue loss should be curbed 
171; 15 T.C. I, 9-10 (1965). 
1 77 Rev. Rul. 71-Hi2, 1971-1 C.B. 97. 
17H S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1969). See Treas. Reg. 
* 1.183-2(c) (example 6) (although no income yet realized, several patents obtained 
and extensive efforts to "market" inventions). 
17!J Proposals for Tax Change, note 15R W/Jra, at 96-97. 
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regardless of the class of taxpayer involved, but capitalization of pre-
operating expenses, including R & D before an invention is commer-
cially acceptable, is neither conceptually justifiable nor the appropriate 
means to accomplish that goal. Either an overall limitation on artificial 
accounting losses as proposed by the Administration in 197 3 180 or a 
mandatory capitalization of all pre-operating expenses with the right 
to then amortize them over some fixed period, such as sixty months, 
should be enacted. Both section 17 4 and the current narrow section 
248 amortization of corporate organizational expenses 181 offer a pattern 
for the latter approach. Unless the Supreme Court decides to fashion 
a requirement that start-up costs are to be deferred until their related 
income is produced and are then deductible against such income as 
earned, which is not the same as capitalizing them, it should reverse 
Snow. 
CONCLUSION 
The demand for reform of the current treatment afforded tax shelters 
through limiting the deduction of accelerated deductions against unre-
lated income 182 has been growing. Undoubtedly the tax administrators, 
and possibly the courts as well, are feeling the pressure to curtail such 
deductions within the existing tax structure. Apparently, the areas in 
which the Service has determined to seek such limitations are section 18 3, 
which disallows, not capitalizes, deductions claimed in an activity that 
is not engaged in for profit, and the preparatory stages to engaging in a 
trade or business concept. Section 183 is an awkward tool for this task 
since "profit," which excludes a mere intent to reduce taxes, encompasses 
a bona fide intent to achieve an ultimate economic profit in addition to 
tax savings. Similarly, the term "trade or business' together with the 
remedy of capitalization of "ordinary" pre-operating expenses are inap-
propriate to defer the deduction of accelerated expenses until the related 
income is realized. But if Congress does not act quickly with respect to 
accelerated deductions, the courts may be sorely tempted to use these ap-
proaches to match expenses and income, however roughly and inequi-
tably. Unfortunately, any precedents thus created would undoubtedly 
18o See note 158 supra. 
181 One commentator has suggested that all corporate pre-opening expenses should 
be treated as organizational expenses under section 248. Carruthers, Jr., How to Treat 
the Expenses of Organization, Reorf!,anization and Liquidation, 24 N.Y.U. lNST. ON 
FED. TAx. I 055, 1062 ( 1966). While equitable and as a policy matter possibly the 
approach that should be legislatively adopted, this argument ignores the narrow 
definition of organizational expenditures promulgated in the regulations. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (2). Pre-opening expenditures might come closer to the statutory 
language of section 248 (b), but query whether they are incident to the creation of 
the corporation. In any event the regulations faithfully track the Committee Print 
Technical Explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A64 (1954). 
182 See note 158 supra. 
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be extended to situations in which there was no tax shelter intent.183 
Conversely, the tax collector should be aware that implementation of 
make-shift judicial remedies will probably lessen the pressure for true 
and equitable reform by Congress. 
18~ See Spheeris v. Comm'r, '161 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972) (denial of section 355 
on preparatory theory). 
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